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THE DOUBLE LOYALTY OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY ¹


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The major task of all our theological seminaries is to prepare men for the Christian ministry. It is true that some men who go out from our seminaries will be diverted into other lines of religious service. A few become teachers; others are drawn into the cogs of ecclesiastical machinery in administrative functions for which they are peculiarly fitted. Here and there a man goes through some hard, unhappy experience in a parish and leaves the ministry altogether to become a radical free lance. But these men are in the minority.

The majority of the men who graduate from the seminary become the teachers and pastors of our churches. And whatever the inevitable disciplines and disappointments of their work, they will remain parish ministers to the end. This means that they will do their active work in the world and will make their contribution to the religious life of their time primarily through their identification with three or four successive groups of men, women, and little children to whom they minister.

¹ An address delivered at the opening session of the Harvard Divinity School and Andover Theological Seminary for the academic year 1919-20.



It should be perfectly apparent to every man who enters this office that he has a double loyalty. He has a loyalty, in the first place, to Christian truth, made known and to be made known to him in his own religious experience. And then he has a second loyalty to his fellow human beings with whom he lives and works. This double loyalty is by no means confined to the ministry. It is a part of every earnest life. It is the double loyalty of the doctor to the wide knowledge and high ethic of his profession and to the immediate human need of his patient. It is the double loyalty of the lawyer to the ideals of the law and to the concrete claims of his client. It is the double loyalty of the teacher to the absolute truth and to the immediate intellectual attainment of his pupil.

Now there is not and there never can be in daily life any perfect reconciliation of these rival loyalties. Students of the old Greek tragedies have often pointed out that the tragic element in those sombre dramas does not lie in a collision of good and evil. The moral problem would then be a simple one, without perplexity and poignancy. The essence of tragedy lies in a collision of loyalties, each of which is good in itself but which cannot be reconciled to the other in a given dilemma. In every tragedy, when choice and action become inevitable, there is always the sacrifice of a minor good for the sake of a major good, which involves the actor in a moral loss. The mother cannot square her loyalty to her husband with her loyalty to her children. The king cannot square his loyalty to the state with his duty to his family. In these homely but imperious dilemmas is found the essence of all tragic action.

There is no escape for any one of us from these tragic collisions in human life. Each one of us has to endure the moral friction which arises when his loyalty to truth, to duty, to the absolute good, cuts across his devotion to

family, friends, country, church. And it is the memory of values which have had to be relinquished, sometimes absolute, sometimes concrete, which makes up the deeper unhappiness and moral pathos of much of our human life.

There is no man in the world who has to feel this clash of loyalties more keenly than the Christian minister. He never perfectly squares his duty as a preacher with his duty as a pastor. He is, on the one hand, the spokesman for what is confessedly the most absolute idealism in the world — the uncompromising religion of Jesus Christ. He realizes as he reads the history of the church that most of the moral and strategic failures of Christianity have been due to the persistent ecclesiastical habit of underwriting the Christian counsels of perfection with permissive commandments, in which the moral austerity and therefore the creative energy of the gospel have been frankly “minimized” to meet the world as it happens to be. And the man of moral fervor and religious aspiration who knows his two thousand years of Christian history well, turns from its pages to his day’s work with the resolute determination not to sell out his distinctive spiritual heritage for a mess of pottage by way of a passing popularity. This is what George Tyrrell meant when he stood at the parting of the ways in his Modernist pilgrimage and said, “I am driven by a fatality to follow the dominant interest of my life, though it should break half the heart of the world.” There is no one of us in whom a pitiless and resolute utterance of this sort does not awaken an instant moral echo.

And yet this is not the only loyalty of the Christian minister. The man who ministers to his fellow men in religion becomes increasingly conscious of a paradoxical and rival duty to our very unideal human nature. He does not preach to a world where his absolute idealism is accepted or even generally understood. He feels at times

the mood of the ancient prophet who cried, "Ah, Lord God, they say of me, Doth he not speak parables!" And, always struggling against this stern devotion to truth, there is something within him bidding him to hear and heed "the still sad music of humanity."

It was Tyrrell himself who felt most poignantly the moral tragedy of his choice, and the consequent annihilation of many intimate and homely values which his course demanded of him. In the whole history of contemporary religious experience there is no passage so filled with the unutterable pathos of spiritual tragedy as are the sentences in which Tyrrell chronicles his own misgivings as to the final validity of his choice in turning his back upon his mother and sister, who sorely needed him, for the sake of the sombre austerities of the Society of Jesus:

"Well I remember my last day at home, my last day with those two now hid in death's dateless night, who were my share of the world, the best this life has had for me; whom I forsook — for what? in the name of all that is sane and reasonable! For a craze, an idea, a fanaticism? Or for love of and zeal for the truth, the Kingdom of God, the good of mankind? Had I been faithful to duty all along, had I worked hard at school and after, had I stayed at home and supported my mother and sister; and made their sad narrow lives a little brighter and wider, would not God have given me light, had it been needful for my salvation? And would not my chances of salvation have been better than they now are? Have I done so much good to others who had no claim on me, as to atone for my neglect of those who had every claim? What have I given up or forsaken for the service of God, as I suppose some would call it, except my plain duty. These are the pleasant doubts that fill my mind at spare moments and make me say, 'Surely, I have lived in vain!'"

This friction arising from the double loyalty of the Christian ministry creates for us all a moral problem to which we must give renewed thought. It gradually dawns upon a man as he lives and works that there is no cheap and easy solution of his dilemma. He comes at

last to realize that he too must be again and again the central figure in the ever-renewed moral tragedies of human life; that much of the comfort of his life will have to come from "the things that he aspired to be and was not," either as a preacher or a pastor. But it is not too much to hope that he may establish in the main some working relationship between these two loyalties, which will enable him to go on with his ministry in some measure of spiritual peace.

Our life in the academic world is devoted almost entirely to the quickening of our loyalty to religious truth. Perhaps it would be better to say to the intellectual and moral habit of truthfulness. For liberal Protestantism is not a body of clearly defined religious belief and practice; it is distinctively a religious method, a way of thinking and meeting the world. This cardinal virtue of sincerity has with us supplanted the older ideal of an immutable orthodoxy. And our theological disciplines, in so far as they bear ultimately on character and through character on the world, look primarily to the perfecting of this inner integrity, which we have come to know as sincerity. It does not matter very much what the stone may be on which a man grinds his soul to this cutting edge of a clean sincerity. One course in the curriculum may serve as well as another. None of our several departments has any prerogative in this matter. For the object of all our disciplines together is so to sharpen the mind and the conscience to the biting edge of keen sincerity that the conventions and orthodoxies and idols of the marketplace shall not blunt that edge when it is laid against them. The earnest mind of our own time will stand almost anything from a minister today if it can only believe that his soul has been tempered and ground to this rare, fine edge of a clean sincerity. The world will endure from him heresies and treasons which it would not tolerate for a moment from patently insincere men, be-

cause it knows instinctively that in such spirits has always lain and still lies the hope of its own salvation.

It is to be written down to the credit of most of our theological seminaries that they are now graduating into our ministry a body of comparatively sincere men. The Christian church may be unable to boast in our own time of some of the outstanding intellects and men of administrative genius who adorned and guided her in other days. But in some very real measure Robert Browning's prayer in *Paracelsus*, "Make no more giants, God, but elevate the race!" has been answered in the modern ministry. The level of sincerity has been tremendously raised in the last half-century. This is the net result of the whole modern critical method of theological instruction. And no honest man will minimize the clear gain to the Christian church in a ministry which, whatever its other patent shortcomings, is newly possessed by a spiritual integrity.

For all the too familiar strictures of the secular world upon the church, it remains true today that there is no great modern institution where men are as free to say what they really think as the pulpits of our liberal churches. There is still, alas, intellectual mediocrity and timidity and moral compromise left in the pulpit. But on the whole there is as little of it there as in any other great institution or profession. Unless a man is to dissociate himself altogether from the organized life of his time and live as an isolated mugwump, he may enter the ministry with the assurance that he will there enjoy an intellectual and moral liberty as great if not greater than that to be found in the law, in medicine, in teaching, in politics, or business.

Now no man would breathe a word of criticism or rebuke upon the on-going development of this newly felt devotion to sincerity. What Carlyle calls "the fixed indubitable certainty of experience" is in religion today

our primary moral obligation. But the man who goes into the Christian ministry needs also to be reminded, particularly at the outset of his work, that he of all men in the modern world has also a moral duty to humanity, to those — in the great phrase of the prayer from the Fourth Gospel — “whom God has given him out of the world.”

Most of the failures of the average minister in the early years of his pastorate, and some of the final tragedies of men who leave the ministry altogether, broken and discouraged, rise from the fact that sincere men become so absorbed in the statement of their major loyalty that they lose sight of human life to which they minister. They go out fired with a splendid passion to speak the truth, come weal, come woe, and they forget, what all Christian ministers ought to remember, that truth is always most potent in history when it is spoken in love.

There are, at the present moment, two contributory causes to this almost universal failure of the ministry to mediate its truth by means of a great charity for mankind. The first of these causes which lead to a neglect of our devotion to humanity, is the persistence in the pastorate of the scientific point of view, which dominates our religious disciplines today. In his recent volume of Gifford Lectures Professor Sorley says:

“Our intellectual interests fall into two distinct classes, according as they are centered in the universal or in the individual. In the whole region of what is called the sciences the interest in the universal is supreme. What we are in search of is general principles or general laws. Things and processes are not regarded as individuals or as interesting for their individuality — for what distinguishes them from everything else — but for what they have in common with other things and processes. The uniformity of nature is the supreme principle, and individuals are but examples which prove the law or cases which illustrate its operation.”

The aim of the modern science of religion is to discover for us the universal and reliable laws of the spiritual life.

There is not and there should not be for any one of us any escape from the most rigorous scientific discipline in religious history, in the classical literature of religious experience, in the development of the Christian ethic, and in the increasingly important body of religious psychology. But the just and inevitable prominence of the scientific method in our theological preparation for the actual work of the pastorate does bring with it a very real liability on the human side. This is the liability to ignore and neglect the claim of the individual to be in himself a centre of spiritual value.

This liability is not confined to the ministry. It is shared equally by the members of every other profession which rests upon a scientific training and point of view. We have become all too familiar in the modern world with the specialist type of mind which is primarily interested in human life as an interesting congeries of types, classes, and movements. There is the modern medical specialist, whose professional interest in a patient is confined to the diagnosis of the "case," so much more scientific fodder for the machine which grinds out universal laws. Darwin's complaint that he had become such a machine and had lost the power to care for poetry, music, and the drama, is a confession of scientific liability which has an increasing validity with the spread of the scientific temper.

There is, therefore, a very grave danger in the ministry that the measure of mastery over the general laws of the spiritual life, which the seminary genders, may become a liability in the pastorate, for the very reason that it has unconsciously trained us to regard our fellow men as of primary value because they may be neatly classified, ticketed, and put away in the card catalogue of our general knowledge. The newly ordained minister tends to find his people mainly interesting and important as individuals because they are more laboratory material

on which he may perform his intellectual operation. They are his first "cases." In other words, a genuine scientific interest in the laws of the spiritual life, so far from fostering a devotion to humanity, may often dissipate what the scientist chooses to regard as the miasma of personal affection.

But this is merely to increase for the subjects of the theological investigation an ill which is already too acute. What troubles the average man today is just this fact that nobody seems willing to treat him personally as a centre of distinctive and inalienable values. "No man cared for my soul," is the perfectly valid cry of the average man as he faces governments, industries, institutions, in the modern world. And from the world's indifference to himself it is not a far leap to the suspicion that God does not care for him individually; that God, like the scientist, is interested in types and species but careless of the individual. The greatest stumbling-block to the acceptance of the Christian religion on the part of the average thoughtful man today is his inability to comprehend and realize as a matter of personal experience Jesus' tremendous saying about the sparrow falling to the ground. This is a difficulty which is deeply felt and freely confessed by all men who have in any way been scientifically disciplined. "I see no reason," wrote Huxley, "to suppose, as Christianity asserts, that God stands to us in the relation of a Father, loves us and cares for us. . . . Science everywhere reveals the passionless impersonality of the unknown and the unknowable." And modern science has communicated something of this "passionless impersonality" to all the great modern professions. But for the Christian minister to face his fellow human beings as one more disciple of "passionless impersonality" is little short of a religious tragedy. He, of all men in the world today, ought to be the mediator and incarnation of the mind and heart of Jesus, to

whom every individual was a centre of unique and inalienable values.

And the other cause for the neglect in the modern ministry of a devotion to humanity is in some very real measure a reflection of the stress which is laid at the present moment upon the office of the prophet. The conception of the minister as a priest, that is, as a man who goes to God with the needs of the people on his soul, has almost disappeared from the ministry of our liberal churches. In so far as there is any model in Biblical tradition for our office, that model is generally said to be found in the Hebrew prophet. The recovery of Hebrew prophecy from the meshes of allegory and prediction is probably the most signal achievement of Biblical criticism. The moral energy released by the resurrection of these noble souls from their neglect and misunderstanding has led many a modern minister to covet for himself also the deep joy of coming to the world with the rubric "Thus saith the Lord." So to live and think that we may be the vehicle for religious certainty is one of the noblest ideals which we may covet for our office.

But as one reads the classical history and content of prophecy as it is found in the Old Testament, one is inclined to make certain reservations as to the entire suitability of this ideal for the modern ministry. What we sometimes miss in the prophets is just that gentle and patient charity by which St. Paul nurtured the early churches of his spiritual begetting. The Hebrew prophet was half political agitator, half itinerant evangelist. He was a religious teacher, but he was not a pastor. He came and said his prophetic word in all its majesty and simplicity, and then he went. His effectiveness was in part due to his detachment from his audience. He was a voice from another world. The tremendous effectiveness of this type of religious leader in history cannot be denied. But the conditions which made it effective in early times

are the very conditions which it is almost impossible to realize in a permanent pastorate.

The spectacle of Amos coming from Tekoa and prophesying in Bethel and returning again to the wilderness, is one of the most exhilarating in all religious history. But when we of the modern ministry try to play Amos to the modern world, we are crippled at the outset by the depressing conviction that we ourselves have been living in Bethel all the while, that we never have broken away to get the moral perspective of life as seen from Tekoa; indeed, by the suspicion that there may not be any wilderness of Tekoa left in the world. Tolstoi spent his life trying to get to Tekoa and never got there. He died, as he had lived, a citizen of our modern world-Bethel. In other words, the social conscience has widened since the days of Amos to include the prophet himself. There seems to be no point of absolute moral detachment and aloofness from the life of our age. And even if there were, men's tempers have changed, so that such a wilderness would seem to few men really a point of moral vantage. The problem which the modern preacher states is his own problem; the guilt which he ascribes to his age comes from his lips not as a scathing denunciation of others but as a halting confession of his own original sin as a member of modern society.

There is no more effective statement of this characteristic point of view to be found in contemporary literature than the preface to Shaw's play, "Major Barbara":

"When an enthusiastic young clergyman first realizes that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners receive the rent of sporting public-houses, brothels, and sweating dens, or that the most generous contributor to his last charity-sermon was an employer trading in female labor cheapened by prostitution, or that the only person who can afford to rebuild his church or give his boy's brigade a gymnasium is the son-in-law of a Chicago meat-king, that young clergyman has, like Barbara, a bad quarter of an hour. But he cannot help himself by refusing to accept money from anybody except sweet old ladies

of independent income and gentle and lovely ways of life. He has only to follow up the income of the sweet old ladies to its industrial source, and there he will find Mrs. Warren's profession and the poisonous canned meat and all the rest of it. His own stipend has the same root. He must either share the world's guilt or go to another planet."

It is just this widening of the circle to include the prophet himself which somehow makes the office of the modern preacher unlike that of the Hebrew prophet. The deeply religious man today will say with Browning's "Gram-marian," "Oh, if we draw a circle premature . . . sure, bad is our bargain." And it is the shrewd suspicion that when the would-be prophet tries to draw such a premature circle of denunciation from which he begs to be personally excused, he does so either in ignorance of all the facts which go to the making of his own circumstances or else in deliberate Pharisaism. The number of men who are in the moral position to play Amos to the modern social order is almost negligible.

Now all this means that in so far as the modern minister sets up for himself the prophetic ideal as the norm for his office, he sets himself in a certain moral opposition to his people which is patently wanting in charity and which is actually unwarranted by the facts of modern life. For these facts compel the minister to admit that he also is a citizen of Bethel, no matter what his professional preference for Tekoa as a moral headquarters.

These two persistent causes then contribute at the present moment to the minister's failure in devotion to the men and women who make up his immediate world — first, a scientific interest in the universal laws of the religious life to the neglect of individual values; and second, a conception of the ministry as a kind of modern Hebrew prophecy calling for a moral detachment from society which is almost impossible of present attainment.

When we turn to the minister's development of this second loyalty to human nature we realize that it is only life itself which will reveal to him its claim to his consent. Men do not come easily and quickly, even in the Christian ministry, to the conclusion that persons are what matter in our world. This conviction comes as a kind of conversion with the ongoing of life itself. But it is reasonably certain that many ministers might spare themselves much of the persistent loneliness and unhappiness of their lives as well as some of its ultimate tragedies, if they determined in advance that their sincerity should be mediated to the world by charity.

When we begin to speak in this way we are at once suspected of counseling compromise, of suggesting a certain paring down and diluting of truth and truthfulness so that they shall be less offensive to the god-of-things-as-they-are, who is secretly worshiped by so many timid, lazy, and selfish persons. The word "compromise" is the ugliest word in the dictionary. And it is true that when a preacher begins to measure his words so that they shall match the immediate moral attainment of his hearers, his ethical fervor and his religious insight are imperiled. But, on the other hand, there is an hour in the history of sincerity when it may soon and easily sour into fanaticism or bigotry, and once a man's heart and mind are thus soured, he has lost the power, if not also the moral right, to speak to the vast majority of his fellow men about the things that belong to their peace.

Compromise is a kind of inglorious muddy mean between truthfulness and time-service. It is to be eschewed at all costs. What we all are seeking is an attitude which somehow grasps the two loyalties in a comprehensive vision, even though it may not reconcile them. Höffding is right when he says that the world comes to us with its hard and fast alternatives — "Either-Or" — and that in those moments it is the business of religion to help us

say "Both-And." The man who knows only one major loyalty of the ministry to a pitiless sincerity and whose ruling principle in every dilemma is "All or Nothing," may find himself led with Ibsen's Brand into futility as well as heartlessness. Or if there be in his attitude toward the fallen and despicable world a touch of relenting, that relenting may take the form of moral pity. Now pity is the virtue of an aristocrat. There is just that touch of condescension about it which goes so ill in a democratic age, and which makes it so unwelcome to those who are to be its beneficiaries. It will not do to pity the modern world of men any more than to ignore them.

What the average man needs when he starts in his ministry is to have his heart thawed out toward all sorts and conditions of men. "As a young man," wrote Mr. H. G. Wells the other day, "I affected the pose of the cynic; but I must now confess that at the age of sixty, and greatly helped by the War, I have fallen in love with humanity." That is precisely the experience which every minister must have, and the sooner after leaving the seminary the better. He is sound as to his major loyalty to truth. His knowledge of the content of religion is sufficient to cover the emergencies which he will meet as a "general practitioner." What is too often wanting is a perception of the homely human reality which is his parish, the intimate joys and sorrows of our common human life, its concrete perplexities and its inarticulate aspirations.

This is what F. H. Bradley means when he says in one of his later volumes, "It is not merely one of the doctrines of religion but the central doctrine, the motive of all religious exercise, that God cares for each one of us individually, that he knows Jane Smith by name, and what she is earning a week, and how much of it she devotes to keeping her poor old paralyzed mother." If this be the central doctrine of all religion, and it certainly is very

near the heart of Christianity, it is surely incumbent upon the Christian minister also to know Jane Smith by name and to enter in some measure into her life and struggle.

The problem of developing something more than a professional acquaintance with Jane Smith is a very real one. It is easy enough to recognize her name each time it turns up in the card-catalogue of the parish. For five dollars any one of the memory-system mongers who advertise in the magazines will teach us a system of mnemonics by which her name may be linked with her face. But this is only a poor beginning at the matter. Jane Smith will be pleased to be called by name at the second meeting. But the real problem is far deeper than that; it is to see life and to experience religion from Jane Smith's premises. Thus and thus only can her minister become to her a real teacher and pastor. And the man whose system of mnemonics sometimes plays him false will be forgiven by Jane Smith if only he speaks to her with insight and sympathy.

The Christian minister should learn to enter into the lives of those to whom he ministers by taking the simpler and deeper experiences of his own life quite seriously, as not exceptions to the common lot but rather as a clue to what happens to men and women everywhere, always, to all. The superficial conditions of human life are constantly in flux. Our sociological milieu is always changing. But underneath the shifting, superficial aspects of life there lies a deeper and unchanging drama of birth and death and love and work and play. The passing of the centuries changes this deeper lot of man little or not at all. And it is at this deeper level that the Christian minister really touches human life. Ancient custom and men's desire associate him with these more permanent and vital aspects of their experience. No ministry escapes for any length of time from some intimate share in these profound and homely dramas of our

common humanity. Now no minister who once senses this intimate and imperious element in human life, which remains almost static in spite of the vicissitudes of history, will ignore the teaching of these very elements in his own experience. He will not look upon his own profession as an exemption from the common lot of man. Rather, his own difficulties in relating his absolute idealism to the problems of his own family life, the regulation of his money affairs, his duties as a citizen in the State, his pleasures and recreations, all the gladness, perplexity, and sorrow of his own daily life, he will freely use as the direct teaching of his own personal experience to make him patient and gentle, as he brings his major loyalty to bear upon the men and women who make up his charge. Mark Rutherford says somewhere that he has often observed that the greatest help we get in time of trouble is given to us by some friend who comes to us and says quite simply, "I have experienced all that." Happy is the Christian minister whose unprofessional life is deep enough and broad enough, so that he can go to the world of men in their homely joys and sorrows and say, "I have experienced all that!" Such a word from such a man is worth all the formal creeds and codes of Christendom. If the minister is to be loyal to his people, to look upon them and to work with them in charity, he will first of all try to live simply and deeply himself, and then will fearlessly use his own more intimate experience as the open sesame into what otherwise will be to him "the secrets of many hearts."

Then while not relinquishing his prophetic passion to be, in his best moments, the voice of God, he will strive to become at the same time the voice of his people's better self. A man in the pews has said of one of our contemporaries, "He has the gift of putting into words for us what we have always wanted to say but never were able to say. And that is a very great gift." Perhaps we do

not wish to revive definitely the priestly function in our free churches; the priestly office lends itself so easily to ecclesiastical abuse. But there was something in the old idea that in the priest the people had an articulate voice for their better selves. So far as our free churches are concerned, it may be better to say that the modern minister stands to his parish in the relation of the research worker, the experimental investigator in religion. He is to work out for men and women who have neither the time nor the training to do so for themselves, a credible Christian creed and a practicable Christian ethic. But always in his wrestling with the religious doubts of his day he must include himself among the doubters; in his attack upon the broad social evils of his time he counts himself among the guilty; and into his bolder spiritual aspirations he welcomes his people not as spectators but as participants. The preacher today who takes his stand outside his congregation and preaches at them, no matter with what moral fervor and religious enthusiasm, will never really move the mind and will of his time. Shaw's bishop who says, "I am not a teacher; only a fellow-traveller of whom you asked the way. I pointed ahead — ahead of myself as well as of you," is really the most effective type of modern minister. The secret of a really useful ministry under present conditions is to be found in the tacit, perpetual suggestion both of a man's preaching and of his pastoral work, that he is himself one of the audience to which he speaks. Neglect of this subtle but absolutely fundamental distinction between the ancient Hebrew prophet and the modern Christian minister, will insulate all a man's good will toward his fellows and render it ineffectual.

Again, the preacher who wishes to understand more accurately the varied lots of all sorts and conditions of men will occasionally set out on what we may call the sociological adventure. In its characteristic contempo-

rary form this deliberate transfer of your life from one environment to another for the sake of social insight is a rather recent feature of our world. It is true that long ago John Woolman got off his horse and walked the roads of Jersey, that he might thus better understand the lot of the common laborer; that he traveled to England in the steerage rather than in the cabin, that he might share the squalor and discomfort of his less fortunate fellow passengers. But John Woolman was before his time in this as in many other matters. In recent years, however, this method of bridging the social gulfs has become one of the recognized means of establishing communication and understanding between those whose lots are superficially very far apart. Tolstoi among the laborers in the corn field, Jane Addams at Hull House, Thomas Mott Osborne in the solitary cell at Auburn prison, Charles Fleischer in the shipyard, Donald Hankey as a private in the ranks when he might have had a commission for the asking, all of them have been primarily interested to understand better the life, the interests, and the motives of great social groups other than their own — peasants, prisoners, slum dwellers, artisans, Tommies.

Now and again, particularly in the care-free years, it is a good thing for the Christian minister to go on one of these modern quests after the secret life of his fellow men. To be one with them even for a little while, to share their tasks and to eat their bread in the sweat of the common brow, is an illuminating experience. No minister who ever spent a casual week or a vacation month upon one or another of these adventures, inadequate as his experiment may be for any final pronouncement upon the problems he has met, counts such days as lost. They remain for him in all later life as shafts of light, penetrating what must otherwise be gross social ignorance. To do this thing occasionally immensely quickens one's charity for humanity. But life is too short and the

duties of the pastorate too many and exacting for us to hope to make the round of the world in this desultory way. And in the last analysis the minister is thrown back upon his own imagination to picture to himself the varied life and lot of man. If he is the man he should be, he can realize Jane Smith even more effectively in his own study than by merely working in her factory or taking lodgings in the squalid tenement over her flat.

The secret of a growing charity for mankind rests upon the development of the imagination. There is an old and familiar distinction between fancy and imagination, upon which the English poets of a hundred years ago harped with wearisome reiteration. Wordsworth and Coleridge wore the subject threadbare. But still vast numbers of supposedly educated men fail to make the vital distinction. Fancy is the flight of the mind released from all bondage to fact. It is our inner power to build air-castles in Spain and to picture "the light that never was, on sea or land." But the field in which imagination works is the field of hard fact, and the function of the imagination is to change a barren and bony fact into a warm and living human reality. It is the redemption and resurrection of all our statistics and surveys from the grave of indifference. It is the cry from the heart of us as we look out upon the laboriously gathered and pedantically compiled information of our time, "Lord God, can these bones live?" Imagination is, in short, the mind's inner power to get out of its immediate environment and to put itself over there yonder in the alien fact, and then to clothe that fact and breathe the breath of life into it and to make it live by that miracle as a part of one's own experience.

Every really great man has this power or this gift as an integral part of his greatness. Certainly all creative work rests upon this premise. Balzac says of himself in his relation to his characters, that he wore their rags,

walked in their tattered shoes, felt the pangs of their hunger and their tears pouring down his face. So the great Christian grace of charity rests, in the last analysis, not upon a multiplication of our own meagre experience to the *n*th power nor upon desultory social pilgrimages, but upon our ability to imagine how life looks to the other man. One of the profoundest utterances that was ever made about what we call the modern social problem is a chance remark dropped by an English essayist, "The broken link between classes in the modern world is a fundamental defect of imagination." It is this inherent inability of our great social groups to see the other man's point of view, which makes all our boards of conciliation and arbitration such poor social solvents.

The exercise of the imagination is very near to a religious function. Indeed it is utterly impossible for a man to put into practice the Golden Rule, the simplest of all Christian principles, without this ability to put himself in the other man's place as well as insisting that the other man put himself in our place. If we are to be men of real imagination, we must be unselfish men, not at the check-book level of an occasional easy benevolence, but at the deeper level of an inner unselfishness. We must be willing to get entirely out of ourselves, to perform that rare and almost superhuman feat of ignoring for the moment the familiar premises of our habitual creed and code, and in this moment of intellectual and emotional selflessness we must put ourselves over yonder in the other man's shoes and get the angle and feel of life from where he stands.

It follows hard after this statement, that every failure of imagination is in some real measure the result either of intellectual laziness or intellectual selfishness. There are a great many otherwise impeccable sermons preached in our churches, which are hopelessly vitiated by their lack

of imagination, that is, by the intellectual selfishness and idleness of the preacher, who uses the prophetic hour as an opportunity to discuss problems which interest him but which simply do not exist for the vast majority of men. Many of us preachers fall unconsciously, but none the less truly, under the woe which Ezekiel pronounced, "Woe be to the shepherds of Israel that do feed themselves! Should not the shepherds feed the flocks?"

There is nothing more striking in the Gospels than the strange and instant hold which Jesus had over all sorts and conditions of men. They seem to have felt that he understood them, that he knew in advance how life looked to them. Jesus' interlocutors never trouble to explain themselves to him. To do so would be an insult to his charity. They take his understanding of them for granted. And we must suppose that this direct understanding of humanity was in Jesus' case the result not so much of the extension of his own experience to cover the common lot, certainly not of any artificial and self-conscious "social settlement" sojourning with fishermen and publicans, but rather of an inner unselfishness, which fulfilled itself in an unfailing power of the imagination to enter into the other man's lot and need. It has been very plausibly suggested that Jesus' silence at his trial was the outcome of this quality of his mind; that he saw Pilate's position so clearly that there was nothing he could say in self-defense; that, Rome being what it was, he realized that Pilate had no option but to kill him. However this may be, we must feel that Jesus' power over our common humanity is a power which springs in part from his unswerving loyalty to an absolute idealism, but in equal part also from that other loyalty which is suggested by the characteristic and recurring word in the Gospels, "compassion." Compassion and sympathy — they are the same word, one the Latin, the other the Greek

derivative; they both mean experiencing life with the other person. There is no mention, there was no place in the life of Jesus, for the imperfect exercise of this loyalty in the patrician form of pity. Pity was an Old Testament prerogative of a divine Sovereign. Jesus did not pity humanity; he had compassion upon it, he sympathized with it. And one whole half of his power over mankind rests in the fact that we still say of him,

“O Saviour Christ, Thou too art man,
Thou hast been troubled, tempted, tried.
Thy kind but searching glance can scan
The very wounds that shame would hide.”

Such was the imagination of Jesus fulfilling itself in his distinctive grace of charity.

To try to live, therefore, in our inner world an unselfish life, is the secret of a deepening charity for men. To be persistently struggling to complement and correct our academic and professional view of life by Jane Smith's outlook, to share her work in imagination and to bear with her the burden of that paralyzed mother, is to put ourselves in such a relation to Jane Smith that we can really begin to be ministers to her, effecting some kind of contact between our high and holy truth and her humble concrete need. Mr. Wells has told us lately that “All the world is now Job.” It is equally true that all the world is Jane Smith. The minister who does not somehow supplement his theological disciplines by a parallel discipline of the imagination through poetry, fiction, drama, music, may have all theological knowledge and all faith so that he can remove mountains of contemporary agnosticism, and all the prophecies and gifts of tongues in the catalogue, but he will never be happy in the Christian ministry. His office will be to him first a baffling perplexity, then a grave problem, and finally a bitter dis-

appointment. Happy is he if he enters his life's work and labors at it, realizing that half his task is to win this rarest and most potent Christian grace of charity, and that the real secret of each day's working reconciliation of his rival loyalties to God and man rests in his growing power to speak the truth in love!

THE LORD'S PRAYER

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In both the Old Testament and the New there is a climactic point, a passage, I mean, which so epitomizes all the teaching of that section of our Bible that we should be eager to save it were all else to be destroyed. In the Old Testament it is the Ten Commandments, which form a foundation for civil society. Society would go to pieces were not the Ten Commandments understood and usually obeyed. In the New Testament it is the Lord's Prayer, which lays foundations for the harmonious inner life as the Ten Commandments do for the outer. Here speaks the aspiring spirit to its Maker. This is the love-song of the Christian world. Few precepts of our Master, I suppose, have been more widely observed than that we are to "pray in this manner." For most of us that day would lack something in which the Lord's Prayer had not been repeated. It fits all circumstances. It is the chant of the saint in his most exultant moments, his refuge and solacé when most depressed. The poor sinner, who through walking in the ways of vice has almost lost the power of aspiration and can no longer formulate for himself his better desires, finds in these sacred phrases his appropriate utterance.

Everywhere, indeed, the Prayer is used. And I believe we should be in error if we thought to disparage it by saying that for the most part it is repeated without our being distinctly aware of its meaning. In this I find no blame. It is a diseased and morbid condition of mind that seeks to be persistently conscious. Our home affections would not be the sweeteners of life that they are if we were asking ourselves perpetually "How much do I

love these members of my household ? ” We preserve sanity best by taking our daily affections as matters of happy course. And just so it is in our ordinary repetitions of the Lord's Prayer. In the common use of it we rise into a sacred atmosphere, where some one holier than we seems to be speaking for us. In its general meaning we partake, but we need not be anxious to search that meaning out. Still, I hold that it is incumbent upon us from time to time to evaluate our treasure. Every noble thing will bear close inspection. The more minutely it is examined, the more do its riches appear. Wisely does the Psalmist say, “The works of the Lord are great, sought out by all them that have pleasure therein.”

I propose then in this paper to hold up the Lord's Prayer to the light and let the sunshine shimmer through it. Let us discern what lies hidden here. Let us, with no irreverent hand, dissect, analyze, become distinctly conscious of the beauty and power of blessing which the Prayer contains. Often has something like this been attempted before. Recognized for nearly 2000 years as an almost magic source of spiritual supply, it has gathered about itself a body of commentary of every degree of worth — historical, textual, theological learning; sermonizing, acute or commonplace; and, best of all, the pathetic utterance by the lowly and unintelligent of thankfulness for benefits received. Though deriving much from the strong scholars and fervent devotees who have preceded me in telling what they have found in the Prayer (and I would call special attention to a wealthy paper by Professor von Dobschütz in this Review for July, 1914), I shall not directly follow in their train. My aim is somewhat peculiar. I approach the Prayer as a lover of psychology and poetry no less than of religion, and would fix attention on some of its less noticed perfections as a work of art. In my judgment it is a masterpiece of literature, whose quality our translators have

astonishingly preserved. Of course all good literature is something more than literature, which is merely a means for giving competent form to the dominant desires of man. The desires themselves are the stuff and substance. In making a literary survey of the Lord's Prayer we must accordingly ask how normal and formative are the desires here engaged, how exactly and simply are they reported, and how well do they come together to form a thing of beauty, good for contemplation, good for stimulus.

As we thus approach the Prayer certain general characteristics of it strike our attention; features of it, I mean, which concern its total structure and pervade it throughout.

In the first place, there is its social character. Its pronouns are *we*, *our*. They are not *I*, *my*. Usually religious emotion is individual — "The Lord is *my* Shepherd; *I* shall not want," "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Here it is collective — "*Our* Father." "Give us this day *our* daily bread." We are bidden to enter into our closet and to shut the door. Yes, but to take the interests of our fellow men in with us. No exclusive blessing is sanctioned. Our Lord seeks to bring all his children together as members of one family; and if we are not prepared for this relationship, if we do not value the common love but care only for that which is bestowed on ourselves and shuts others out, we had better cease the repetition of this Prayer.

Again, it is remarkable how in this Prayer the whole is in every part. Let one ask oneself what is its central petition? I have sometimes thought it was "Thy will be done." But is it, any more truly than "Forgive us our debts," "Hallowed be Thy name," than any one indeed of its many petitions? Each is all, all is in each.

But a peculiarity of it which I think when it first catches our attention is somewhat forbidding is its brevity. Here all spiritual life is supposed to be epitomized. Here are

set forth the relations of our souls to God. Rightly we called this the love-song of the Christian world. And can no more be said than this? Is this brevity characteristic of love? Is it so that love utters itself elsewhere? And why be so poverty-stricken when we approach God? Does not love delight in exuberance, never satisfied, pouring itself out in continually fresh forms? The lover will not content himself with his lady's mere name; he rings a dozen changes on it. He will not speak his affection in straightforward language. He must embroider it all. He repeats his devotion over and over. There are not words enough to set forth his mistress' praises. And yet, when we come to God, a few sentences are counted enough. Is there not here a misunderstanding of love and its need? No! What I have said of the language of love is true, but it is true only of initial and astonished love, love that is unaccustomed to its object and fearful of itself. So speaks the lover who can hardly believe the great fact and is trying to reassure himself. There is a nobler love than that, and one which Jesus has sought to embody in his Prayer. It is the love of assurance. On such intimate terms with him do we live that it is merely the raising of the eye that is necessary, the uttering of a few words. He understands what we have need of before we ask him. All of us know that in this quietude lies the fulfillment of love, when it has escaped its hurry, its need of repetition, and dwells in assured peace with its great object.

But before proceeding farther I think it important to observe that no fixed formula for praying is here offered, but only a type of the worshiper's inner attitudes, whatever his words may be. Central though the Prayer is in our Lord's teaching, as the Ten Commandments in the teaching of Moses, it cannot be taken as a formula, for it is never used again. No one who prays afterwards in the New Testament employs this form. We hear Jesus

praying, but it is in other words than these. Stephen prays, Paul prays, but in phrases dictated by their immediate circumstances. No, it is not a formula. We are not bidden to confine our prayers to these particular words. It is a method. Indeed, it is impossible for us to employ it as a formula, for we really do not know what its words are. Though recorded twice, the accounts do not agree. In every sentence there are variations, and these by no means slight. Consider a few of them. In one or the other of its two statements, whole clauses are omitted. "Our," at the opening, is omitted. "Who art in heaven" is omitted. "Thy will be done" is omitted. "Deliver us from evil" is omitted, and all that follows is omitted.

Does this injure the Prayer? I think it enriches it. For, in reality, the Church, not knowing what the veritable words of the Master were, has joined with him in the construction of a prayer according to its own requirements. He set the pattern, suggested the manner, provided materials out of which a prayer might be framed. And then the Church, full of needs, saw in that material which he had left us the elements from which the Prayer was to be fashioned. It chose, accordingly, from his words, those which best fitted its necessities; and it added at the close a great clause of its own. As a result we have in this Prayer a sort of induction of the ages, experience after experience shaping appropriate expressions to meet daily needs. Led by our Master, we have gone on as fellow workers with him in the construction of a prayer.

And let it not for a moment be supposed that these additions and adjustments are merely the work of early ages. They have continued up to our time, for we use the Prayer in translation. It is a child's notion that in translation exactly the original is carried over uncolored and that the translator puts nothing of himself into his work.

When precious things are handled, they are apt to bear the mark of him who has touched them. Our translators have observed this, and have not hesitated to compensate for their touches by adding what is appropriate. It is often overlooked that they — yes, and the translators of some other languages, notably Luther in his superb German translation — have set the Prayer to a subtle rhythm. They have thrown it into verse; an iambic-anapestic rhythm has been made to palpitate throughout it. This will be caught more readily if we repeat the Prayer with undue emphasis on the marked syllables:

Our Fátther who árt in heáven,
 Hállowed bé thy náme.
 Thy kíngdom cóme. Thy wíll be dóne
 On eárrh as it ís in heáven.

Here is a veritable stanza, where short, sharp clause calls to clause. Through the whole Prayer, indeed, there is a graduated rhythmic echo. In the early part, relating especially to divine things, that rhythm is kept entire, measured, regular. But as we pass on into the entanglement of human needs, it becomes more broken; and finally, when we reach an experience essentially human, it goes over into plain prose; yet at the close, where the thought of God becomes again prominent, the full cadence returns:

Gíve us this dáy our dáyly breád.
 And forgive us our débts, as wé forgive
 our débtors. And léad us nótt into
 temptátion, but deliver us from évil.

And then comes the closing rhythmic chant:

For thíne is the kíngdom,
 And the pówer, and the glóry,
 Foréver and éver. Amén.

How right, how subtly true were our translators, how responsive to human requirement, when they gave so

suitable a setting to their Prayer! For everywhere aspiration claims rhythm. In rhythm must be expressed our deepest emotions, and the utterances of the will. Prose is left to describe what we observe, it expresses fact. Rhythm expresses hopes. Accordingly, our translators, understanding the human mind with delicacy, have given to this document that form in which it seems simplest to us, most natural, least disturbed. Unfortunately those who prepared the English liturgy had no such fineness of ear, and clumsily substituted for the rhythmic word "debts" the unmanageable "trespasses," a word which does not occur in either of the two forms of the Prayer.

This then is the Prayer which we are to examine, this composite Prayer, as we have it today in its marvelously appropriate form. And, scrutinizing it, we see that it falls into four parts. Here is the hush before prayer. Then our service of God, what we bring to Him. Thirdly, his service of us, what He alone can bring. And, last of all, our rest in Him, our confidence. Let us devote a few words to each.

I venture to call the opening clause "Our Father who art in heaven," the hush before prayer. As we come into that august presence, we bow our heads. He is high and lifted up. He is not to be identified with the actualities and tawdry affairs of our world. He is in the heavens, and we are among the limitations of earth. And yet, his kin we are. There is nothing in his nature which we should not aspire to possess. "Our Father." He who identifies himself with another expresses love. And this is the opening thought of the prayer—love and awe. They should always go together. Certainly either, disjoined from the other, would wreck the Prayer.

In that great hush then, where we know our love and so press forward, where we know his exaltation and so bow our heads, our Prayer opens. But in every nation prayer

has been connected with sacrifice. He who prays brings an offering. Primarily, prayer is giving. The worshiper bestows gifts on him to whom he comes. And how could it be otherwise? Is it not of the very nature of love to give? Have we ever loved any one on whom we did not wish to bestow? The thought of the loved one inevitably brings a desire to spend oneself for his enrichment. Accordingly, the first section of the body of the Prayer is devoted to our service of God; for it has ever been a true thought that prayer is sacrificial. The heathen brings a heifer from his herd. We no less come bringing gifts. But, like all in Christianity, these must be of a spiritual kind. We search, therefore, after what is most precious to our own hearts, and come offering these things to God. And what are they? They are threefold:

“Hallowed be Thy name.” Our standard of worth shall be found in him. Nothing that is not of his nature shall be accounted precious in our sight. Tempted we are continually to call gold of value, to call pleasures delightful, to count our mere continuance in life as something to be sought. All this we sweep away in our first sacrificial offering. “Hallowed be *Thy* name.” All things to us shall be precious according as they bear his mark.

“Thy kingdom come.” What we bring to God shall be no random aspiration. Life shall be organized after his pattern. Our devotion shall be systematic. A very kingdom shall be erected to Him by our endeavors. Good deeds shall match with good deeds; and all be builded up into a suitable place for Him to dwell in.

“Thy will be done.” That is the heart of the matter, and perhaps the hardest of all. We will give up, we promise, our very selves. We come bringing in our sacrificing hands our own will, preferring that his will shall take its place.

Such are the gifts we bring to God, the greatest gifts anyone can bestow. And all of them we give without

limitation of amount, for by an interjected clause we declare we will not rest till earthly offerings attain a heavenly perfection.

But love is always reciprocal. The third section of the Prayer names gifts we desire from God. It is often said that petitionary prayer is a mockery. It has only a reflex influence, working its effects merely on him who prays. It may mellow our nature, exalt our ideals, render a rebellious heart submissive, but it can operate no change in God or outward nature. Strictly speaking, prayer is always addressed to ourselves, as a species of self-communion. God will of Himself give us what we need. It is impious and useless to instruct Him what that shall be. Such thoughts receive no sanction from the Lord's Prayer. It is frankly petitionary. It asks. It announces homely needs and believes God's love is adequate to meet them. How faulty it would be were such confidence omitted! It is a fantastic notion that love simply bestows. No! It is a large receiver; ever two-sided, refusing to make distinction between that which it gives and that which it gets. Between those who love, a frank expression of desire is natural and readiness to give is largely influenced by readiness to receive. The wisest father listens tenderly to the immature requests of his child and allows them to affect his subsequent action. According therefore to the psychology of love, ample room is provided in the Lord's Prayer for petitions. Those petitions indeed cover the entirety of human life. They are naturally threefold; they refer to the present, to the past, to the future.

"Give us this day our daily bread." This relates to the present. And, because the present is essentially transient, with nothing abiding in it, what we pray for is also ephemeral. It is the supply of these decaying bodies, the reasonable thing to think of in any present instant; that is all.

In "Forgive us our debts," we frame a petition with reference to the past. It would at first seem that praying for the past is folly. The past cannot be changed. Why then have wishes about it? There is only one sort of wish which is appropriate, and that a sad one — when we perceive its misuse, and become aware how in the past we have done something which hampers the present and the future. If we were not sinners, we could bid the past go its way, setting our faces entirely toward the future. But we have tied ourselves up in iniquity and are compelled to carry the burden of the past with us. Therefore, in approaching God, we acknowledge this and ask that that past may interfere the least possible with further righteousness.

But such forgiveness is conditional. It occurs only when we too are able to forgive. For many the condition is a stumbling-block. I have known those who hesitated to repeat the Prayer on account of this appalling clause. What if we should be taken at our word and be forgiven only to the degree in which we ourselves forgive! For forgiveness goes against our natural instincts and its very possibility may be doubted. Can I truthfully count him just who has treated me unjustly? So deep are these difficulties that on this clause alone does Jesus offer comment — a comment, however, which merely generalizes the trouble, reiterates, and does not explain it. With an imaginative "for" taking up the unspoken perplexity of his hearers, he declines to analyze the enigma of undeserved love. "For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you."

But as regards the future? Recognizing the lessons of the past, and understanding that our chief solicitude for what is to come should be that we be not through inevitable weakness liable again to such wrongdoing as now pursues us, we put a kind of terror also into our last petition: "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil."

I have said that there is no sign that the thought of Jesus passed beyond this point. But the Church was not contented to pause here. It added what I have called the closing chant. And this was necessary. For, after we have brought our gifts to God, and have asked his for ourselves, we need to be assured that these will certainly be ours. Such certitude the Church finds in the fact that our petitions are rooted in his nature. "For thine is the kingdom." That kingdom is no arbitrary matter, waiting to be constructed by ourselves alone. There is an eternal groundwork already laid. It is as when I come to my father and say "Let me be thy son, for thy son I am." I rely on a fixed fact as my ground of confidence in his love. Just so is God's kingdom fixed. Ours it is to comprehend it, to bring out its earthly significance — not to create it.

Here then in this closing portion the Church expresses its assurance of prayer answered. "For thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory." And let it be noticed that in doing so it returns to those sacrificial gifts which it has already brought. "Thine is the kingdom." We have prayed that his kingdom might come, we have promised it to God; and now we know that He assures it to us. "Thine is the kingdom and the power." So we said, "Thy will be done." "And the glory." Yes, that was our first thought, "Hallowed be thy name." At the close of the Prayer we take up again the original theme or dominant note, as in a piece of music. This thought of the abiding character of that which love both gives and receives swells the massive music of the final clause. It is something properly uttered not by the Master but by ourselves.

I said at the beginning that this Prayer, far from being a formula, is a type. I meant that in it the necessary elements of all prayer are set forth. And these are they: The hush before prayer, our gifts to God, his gifts to us,

assurance, rest in Him. Strike out these, one after the other, and see how prayer is maimed. Strike out the first; you have the hasty and irreverent prayer. Strike out the second; you have the selfish, the greedy, prayer. Strike out the third; you have the adulatory and artificial prayer. Strike out the fourth; you have the anxious and hesitating prayer. Only when all are in some degree present can prayer reach its proper beauty as the natural expression of an exalted, generous, needy, and quiet soul.

“After this manner therefore pray *ye*.”

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE "WE" SECTIONS OF THE BOOK OF ACTS

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How alluring and yet how elusive is the personality of the self-effacing Diarist of the Acts! Modest to the last degree and yet dignified in his quiet assurance that he is an integral part of the most significant spiritual fellowship of his day, a hero worshiper, lost in admiration for his leader and yet singularly correct in his identification of really great events, and always unwaveringly convinced that he is observing and recording consequential affairs, he nobly deserves his place in the comradeship of the Book. The more, therefore, should we like to draw this quiet workman out of his namelessness, and set him in his true place as pioneer of those historians of the clearer insight to whom the expanding church of Jesus Christ has seemed the central fact of the world's life. Can we do him this right? I venture to hope that it may yet be possible.

The consequences, however, are far from being merely a matter of personal justice and recognition. No question is more fundamental to the whole structure of the higher criticism of the New Testament than is the long-debated problem of the authorship of these diary passages of Acts, bearing as they do every mark of being the priceless record of an actual eyewitness to the events described. As such they are the earliest bits of assured first-hand testimony which the New Testament documents afford. This primacy alone would make them of inestimable importance. But farther than this, they are inextricably interwoven with the problem of the authorship of the whole book of Acts, and so also of the Gospel of Luke. Indeed if we could unfold the original mystery

of these sections, it is at least possible that a flood of light would thus be thrown on both the literary and historical habits of the author of Luke-Acts and so not only on the validity and historicity of his results in both books, but also upon the whole Synoptic problem and the bases which lie under it. Indeed there is much to indicate that, with all the study which has heretofore been devoted to the Acts, it is not unlikely that just now the largest hope of critical progress in the New Testament resides in this book; and if so, the question of the authorship of these particular sections is of new significance.

Let us restate the elements of the problem. The "we" passages begin with Paul's departure from Troas on his second missionary journey. Thence the Diarist accompanies him to Philippi, where the "we" is discontinued. Apparently leaving this companion here, Paul goes on his way to Thessalonica and Achaia and thence to Ephesus and Jerusalem. The third missionary journey brings Paul back to Ephesus for a long stay and thence to Macedonia and Greece, whence he once more travels north to Philippi, where the "we" passages again begin. Thus after a separation of six years the Diarist apparently rejoins his leader at the very point where they had parted, the obvious inference being that the intervening years had been spent by him in some association with the Philippian church. Following the reunion a scattered use of the plural pronoun in the subsequent chapters of Acts indicates that he then accompanied Paul on the eventful journey to Jerusalem and Cæsarea and thence, in due time and on the same ship, to Rome, where the book of Acts suddenly, even abruptly, ends. This companionship from Philippi to Rome, covering the most intimate relations, must have occupied about three years. That a man should share with Paul these stirring events and be involved in such an endearing fellowship of suffering and peril during these conspicuous and conse-

quential years, and yet slip through the meshes of all the comprehensive personal references to the Pauline group, seems absolutely incredible. Paul's friends troop through the Acts and crowd the salutatory passages of the Epistles, yet historical cross-questioning has dismissed them all from probable identity with the Diarist. Gradually this process of elimination has seemed to leave but one possible name. Surely this dear companion cannot be unmentioned in the Pauline literature; he must be here; but of all Luke is the only possibility. So the argument has run. Strange indeed it would be if this long-time companion, whose acquaintance must have been scattered all along the line of his thousands of miles of travel with St. Paul, should never be mentioned in the greetings of salutation or remembrance; and yet are we right in the final selection among those who do appear? Was it Luke? Notwithstanding all repeated argument, the doubt has never rested.

Tradition indeed has consistently assigned the completed book of Acts to Luke. We may well surmise, however, that early opinion based itself merely on the same hopeless process of reduction which has been the despair of later critics, only Luke being left apparently as a possibility after the enforced elimination of every other hypothesis of authorship. Then too to those who understand the naïveté of early criticism it is highly suggestive that the phrase, "Only Luke is with me," furnishes exactly the soil out of which such a tradition would be most likely to grow. Nevertheless tradition, whatever its worth, is unanimously in favor of Luke. The consensus begins with the Muratorian fragment (170 A.D.), is accepted as a matter of course by Irenæus, a few years later, and is axiomatic with Eusebius; but beyond the mere matter of authorship there is no information additional to the biblical facts unless it be the Eusebian statements (*Hist. Ecc. III, 4.6*) that Luke was of Antiochean

origin and (*Hist. Ecc. II, 22.6*) that probably the book was written at Rome during Paul's second imprisonment. This of course refers to the book as a whole and leaves untouched the question of the original authorship of the "we" sections. Following this lead, however, those who are committed to the late date of the Acts, have sought refuge in the suggestion that Luke was really the author of these sections only, and that it was around this modicum of truth that the misconception which attributed the whole book to him grew up. On the other hand, those who assign to him the authorship of the completed Acts have felt the special difficulty of refusing him these portions of the book recording, as they do, those very experiences which it seems most possible that he might have shared personally. The atmosphere of the later days of the first century which seems to surround the Acts, together with the growing evidence of the composite nature of the book, certainly make it clear that the theory of the Lukan authorship of the whole book has much to explain; but in either case the theory of the Lukan origin of the "we" passages is germane and has thus a substantial basis in tradition. Is this tradition correct?

In answering the question our first duty is to discover from the "we" sections, if possible, the movement of events and the personal niche into which the undiscovered writer must fit. Of course it is possible that the original diary was much longer than is our present document, and that the compiler of the Acts used therefore only those sections which he found particularly *apropos*. If this is the case, the complete document might seriously modify or complicate the history of the Diarist as it lies on the surface of these excerpts. But there is certainly a strong presumption against this theory of abbreviation, particularly if the omitted sections included farther accounts of any personal relations with or even impressions of St. Paul. The compiler of Acts leans so heavily on

this document and evidently trusts it so absolutely that it seems unlikely, to say the least, that he would completely delete other portions which recorded further personal companionship with Paul. On the other hand, the "we" document, as it now appears, so evidently exists for the primary purpose of telling Paul's story that, in case it was originally longer, it almost certainly included the accounts of any additional relations which the author shared with Paul, if such there were. Of course such an argument cannot be final. It is only this: We have no suggestion of a longer document, and such negative evidence as we have looks quite in the direction of the view that we have in the "we" passages substantially all that this document ever contained *regarding the author's personal fellowship with Paul*. And the probable correctness of this view will be immeasurably increased if we can find any otherwise probable person whose movements fit well into the record as indicated by the document in its present form and limits.

A careful review of the document and also of the circumstances under which the Diarist first appears just as Paul is leaving on his first European adventure, suggests that this new companion must already have been a man of some proved capacity for evangelistic pioneering when he thus steps into our sight. We may certainly assume that no doubtful novice would be associated with a group which is about to enter upon such an epochal undertaking. Nevertheless, if we take the facts as they appear on the surface, this comrade had not previously been associated with Paul. For some reason his fortunes apparently first fall in with Paul's at Troas. At least this should be our experimental hypothesis, and our initial effort should be to find someone whose biography will fit into such circumstances and conditions. From Troas he will then go with his leader to Philippi. Here he will be on new ground, for the whole group is evidently

breaking fresh soil. They have no friends; no one meets them. Their first permanent lodging-place is in the home of a casual new acquaintance, the purple-seller, Lydia, into contact with whom the work accidentally brings them. From the day that the Diarist starts for Macedonia, concluding that with Paul God had "called us to preach the gospel unto *them*," it is evident that he was feeling his way into new surroundings. He is apparently not a Macedonian.

But soon the situation changes. Following, for the present, the omissions as well as the admissions of the document as our guide, it appears that Paul leaves the Diarist at Philippi. The latter is not the founder of this church; Paul is that; but he remains there possibly for six years, and is doubtless the chief constructive influence in the church. The qualities which suggested him originally for the enterprise point him out now to carry on the work in this important center and inevitably involve him in the gathering affection of this company of Christians. His life merges with their life, and it would only be what is natural should he become their most conspicuous representative and leader.

The Philippian church was *par excellence* a generous church. Paul had repeated occasion to refer to this outstanding characteristic. In the Epistle to the Philippians he records the fact that across all the stretch of time and distance this church was mindful of him and remembered him with gifts sent to distant Rome, the memory of which kindness was like sweet incense; and he recalls also that this generosity had been typical of the church from "the beginning of the gospel," for "even in Thessalonica," whence Paul went from Philippi, "ye sent once and again unto my need," and "no church had fellowship with me in the matter . . . but ye only."

Such a church must inevitably have responded to the appeal of Paul for the offering for the Jerusalem church.

This project of a general "collection" looms large in Paul's mind. Doubtless it had an irenic motive, but it was also important as a call to the development of a fundamental Christian grace. His letters to the churches flame with urgency that they make ready by a definite program for the hour when this gift shall be carried to Jerusalem. The formal presentation is to be a notable event, to be accomplished by a deputation composed of messengers (1 Cor. 16 3, 4) selected by the contributing churches in company with Paul himself, if he can go. This deputation is gathering about Paul when, after the six intervening years, he is rejoined at Philippi by the Diarist, who proceeds with the company to Jerusalem. Obviously the church at Philippi will have its leading part in this generosity. There would have been no title ever again to grateful remembrance in Paul's mind if it failed now. Giving generously, the Philippian church will also naturally have its delegate in the deputation. The Diarist gives us the names of the delegates (Acts 20 4). Various sections of the church are represented. Two go from the neighboring church of Thessalonica. Others represent various fields. But no one is *named* from Philippi. This situation can only be explained by the natural conclusion that the Diarist was the Philippian representative.

The importance of this collection-project as it lay in Paul's mind cannot be overstated. The fact that it was of really primary significance and of the highest ecclesiastical consequence is to be gathered from the constant reference to it in his Epistles. It is hardly open to question that the two brethren (II Cor. 8 18-23) who went to Corinth to forward the matter there were already the appointed representatives of the churches of Asia, that they therefore reappear in the deputation as it is later named (Acts 20 4), and that it is because of their commission to this important and responsible service that Paul digni-

fies them by the title of "apostles." In view of this designation, we shall expect the Diarist, as a member of the same group, to be held in like esteem, and we may hope to identify him under the same title of honor and authenticated responsibility; he will be an "apostle" — if this chain of consequences which we have thus followed is correct.

In any case men are known by the company they keep, and we may well draw near to the comrades of the Diarist for such suggestion as they have to give. Of three we know little, but of the others there is something of significance to say. It is the presence of Trophimus at Jerusalem that indirectly causes the trouble which ultimately sent Paul, a prisoner, to Rome (Acts 21 29), and if II Timothy 4 20 is trustworthy, he was at a later day a traveling companion of St. Paul. Of the remaining four, half of the whole number — Timothy, Tychicus, Aristarchus, and the Diarist — the singular fact is to be recorded that they not only accompanied the apostle to Jerusalem but they continued with him or followed him to Rome. In other words, the Diarist is a member of a deputation which is not only of such a formal ecclesiastical nature that its members might be designated as the "apostles" of the churches, but at the same time also, of such a private nature that they are in some peculiar way committed to the personal interests of Paul and to such fortunes or misfortunes as may befall him individually. Under such a dual relation as this the Diarist, if we identify him, must make his appearance.

With such a company the author of the "we" sections goes on his way from Philippi to Jerusalem. He is present at the conference with James and the other elders. Exactly how near he was to the person of Paul during the dramatic events of his arrest and subsequent local trials we do not know, but the intimacy of the account indicates that he was not far away. In any case he is one of the

two companions who, putting their lives in jeopardy, share the perils of Paul's voyage to Rome, as he goes under guard to make his appeal to Cæsar. The Diarist specifies that Aristarchus, one of the deputation, is the third member of the group (Acts 27 2). The plain indication is that his companionship — and if so, that also of the Diarist probably — is voluntary, but it nevertheless must have involved a sharp and perhaps compulsory submission to the limitations of the prisoner for whose sake they were known to be aboard. It is highly probable therefore that it is to this occasion which Paul refers when he later speaks of Aristarchus as his "fellow prisoner" (Col. 4 10), for Paul was not unaccustomed permanently so to identify those who had once shared his prison. He calls them fellow prisoners not as in the present but as having had this relation in the past. Indeed this is his only manner of using the term elsewhere (Rom. 16 7; Philem. 23). If it is indeed thus with Aristarchus, we have every reason to expect that Paul would think of the Diarist as also a "fellow prisoner," and if we shall later find that Paul does thus think of him, it will in turn strengthen our conviction that it is this experience with Aristarchus to which Paul refers when he describes him as a "fellow prisoner."

Thus after anxious days, in which his own life has been absolutely subordinated to Paul's fortunes, the Diarist comes to Rome. Up to this point he has followed the events of his leader's life with an absorbed and concentrated interest. He has absolutely risked all to see how it should fare with his hero at the final tribunal of imperial Rome. Now that leader is on the threshold either of an acquittal, which is to set him free for a world service, or else of a conviction which shall permanently terminate the great career; and yet just before this event is reached, the record stops.

What can this sudden ending indicate ? The strangeness of it all has begotten the theory that the Diarist, or perhaps, if he was a different person, the author of the book of Acts was really not intending to recount Paul's fortunes save as they were involved in the larger theme — how the gospel came to Rome. But if so, he passes over with absolute unconcern the fact that the gospel was already in Rome when Paul arrived, as the Epistle to the Romans and other evidence makes clear, and he shows no interest whatever in the origin of the Roman church. And even if this theory could possibly be correct, it does not explain why, after all our breathless suspense, the personal outcome to St. Paul should be eliminated as of no legitimate interest. There are but two possible theories of explanation for this strange conclusion. Either the diary has for some reason been decapitated, or else the manuscript came to an end because imperative events terminated the companionship thus suddenly. Now of course mutilation is always a possibility. As at the beginning of the manuscript, so at the end there may have been a process of surgery; but, as at the beginning so at the end, the conditions are such as to make this a secondary hypothesis, and our first search must be for some one whose companionship with Paul, otherwise also conformable to the Diarist's experiences, comes suddenly and perhaps unnaturally to an end soon after the arrival at Rome.

Such in general is the Diarist's history, and such is the niche into which the man and his experiences must be adjusted. The details may not be all exact but the main movement is unquestionably correct, and the more exactly the details correspond, the better the identification. Can such a person be found ? As we have thus reviewed his history and the qualities and abilities which it demanded, the more impossible it seems that so conse-

quential a person should slip unidentified through that remarkable drama in which he played so notable a part. Who then can he have been ?

Was it Luke ? Assuming this theory, the meagreness of the information regarding him is our first difficulty. So far as the biblical record goes, there is only Paul's statement (Col. 4 14; Philem. 24) during the first Roman imprisonment, that Luke, the beloved physician, sends salutation, and his additional and necessarily doubtful memorandum in the later Roman imprisonment (II Tim. 4 10) that only Luke is with him. So far as tradition is concerned there is only the record that he was a native of Antioch and that the *completed* book of Acts was his work. And this notwithstanding the fact that if he was the Diarist, he was an intimate and long-time companion of Paul in extended journeys, absorbing experiences, and extreme perils — an outstanding companionship. And yet while other comrades appear and reappear in salutations to and from the churches along the way and are mentioned as fellow prisoners, fellow travelers, apostles, etc., Luke slips by with never such a suggestion and only as one of the Roman group. How improbable this seems!

But the moment we seek to put Luke in the Diarist's place by means of the slight data we possess, the detailed difficulties accumulate. If Luke was an Antiochean, why does his companionship begin at far-off Troas ? He must have known Paul at Antioch. Why no mention of the companionship which brought them the long journey to Troas ? Or if such a record was there originally, then why was it submerged or eliminated when the rest of the document is counted so valuable and is used with such constant trustfulness and interest ? That Luke qualifies as the Diarist on the theory that he had lived in Philippi seems to me wholly unwarranted, as appears from the attitude of the missionary party to their evidently new

surroundings on reaching that city, and the suggestion of such a citizenship indeed appears to proceed wholly from the interesting desire to identify the Diarist with the "man from Macedonia" (Acts 19 9), a supposition which, while surely picturesque, is certainly contrary to the most natural interpretation of the following verse.

Proceeding then to the Diarist's prolonged residence at Philippi where he nurtured and developed the church from infancy to notable strength and prestige, how strange it is that no mention is made of him in the Epistle to the Philippians! This Epistle was written from Rome. If Luke was the Diarist, he was of course in Rome with Paul. He is mentioned as being there in Colossians and Philemon, evidently written almost contemporaneously. Other companions are mentioned in the Philippian Epistle, but this long-time sponsor of the Philippian church, if Luke be that, is never mentioned! The only possible explanation for such a strange fact is that Luke was away on a short visit. But even so, is it not strange that no mention even is made to this church of the pastor who has been Paul's long, devoted, and imperiled companion and to whom he is so profoundly indebted? Would it not be the obvious thing to explain the strange omission by at least a reference to the absence? How can less be possible?

And now of the journey from Philippi to Rome. If we are correct in identifying Tychicus and Trophimus as the brethren referred to in II Cor. 8, 18, 22, then it follows that Paul dignified the members of this deputation by the apostolic title (II Cor. 8 23), a recognition held in such high esteem by him that he counts himself a modest member of that high company. But if Luke was a member of this delegation, no such title is ever bestowed upon him. Again of the two companions with Paul on the sea-voyage from Cæsarea to Rome, if Aristarchus is later called a "fellow prisoner" (Col. 4 10), certainly no such

title is bestowed anywhere on Luke. He is simply the beloved physician and one of a large group of fellow laborers (Philem. 24). And of all the journey and shipwreck, no word!

Finally we come on to assured ground. Luke is evidently a somewhat intimate companion with Paul at Rome. This companionship is continued indefinitely, and, if we accept at all the guidance of II Tim. 4 11, reappears in the second Roman imprisonment, where he is left, the only living witness, to give his invaluable testimony. But the surer we are of this, the more inevitably does the question arise why this faithful Diarist should have left the record of his hero, just as he was on the very threshold of a decision at the hands of the world's highest tribunal, with no word of the result or of those subsequent events with which Luke of all others was surely familiar. How strange the conclusion by which an informed comrade withholds the *dénouement* of Paul's whole dramatic appeal to Rome! Granted even that the personal outcome was not the main concern of the writer's purpose in the book of Acts, it yet remains most inexplicable that this loyal lieutenant, risking all in a crusade with his captain, should dismiss the outcome of those fortunes as unworthy even of passing mention. But of all this there are only the two closing verses of the Acts. The record ends with the *arrival* at Rome. All else is silence. Again the question presses home with redoubled force: Why does the diary end here? Was it originally longer, and if so, why was it abridged? To be sure, all this is negative evidence. But how overwhelmingly cumulative it is! The Lukan theory certainly raises more questions than it solves. Is it the best we can do? If so, we are left in dismay.

I believe this is by no means the best we can do, and I desire to point out the remarkable array of facts which indicate that Epaphroditus (Phil. 2 25; 4 18) who,

as I believe, is identical with Epaphras (Col. 1 7, 4 12; Philem. 23) is the lost Diarist.

The view that these two names belong to one and the same person has long been recognized as the simplest and most plausible theory, but thus far it has run athwart difficulties which have seemed very perplexing but which may presently be entirely cleared away. Epaphras is a shortened form of Epaphroditus. The latter name is used in the Epistles to Philippi and Ephesus; the former in the Epistles to Colossæ and Philemon of Colossæ. All the Epistles were written at Rome and at almost the same time. To hold that these names represented two persons involves the difficult replacement of one man by another of like name in the little circle of workers at Rome. One man is present, the other absent; the second arrives and the first disappears; and the names so nearly identical, and neither appears elsewhere. But in view of the difficulties mentioned above it has seemed the simplest theory.

These difficulties are all contained in the misinterpretation of Philippians 4 18, and it is on this rock that the whole search for the Diarist has been diverted from its true course. In this passage Paul, writing of course from Rome, expressed gratitude to the Philippians, "having received *from* Epaphroditus the things from you." This has been uniformly assumed to mean that after Paul reached Rome the Philippians becoming aware of his need sent Epaphroditus to him bearing certain tokens of love. If Epaphroditus thus came direct from Philippi to Rome *after* Paul arrived there, he could not have been the Diarist who journeyed *with* Paul via Jerusalem. But a more careful examination of the passage, however, makes it unlikely that Epaphroditus was in this sense the bearer of these gifts;¹ and it will be pointed out that the con-

¹ The linguistic facts clearly support the suggestion here made. "From Epaphroditus" exactly duplicates the preposition of "from you." It is the *παρά* of

ditions and simplicities of the situation are better satisfied if we suppose that Epaphroditus was already in Rome with Paul, and that the Philippian church with characteristic thoughtfulness sent a gift to their pastor who we know was ill in Rome, and included with it some remembrance to Paul, which was passed on to him *from* Epaphroditus. In any case Paul could not have better described a gift received under such wholly plausible circumstances.

Indeed when we come to study the details of the event this view strangely fits in with the known facts. Epaphroditus had been seriously ill at Rome; his life had been despaired of, and we know farther that the Philippian church had heard of his condition and was seriously distraught over it (Phil. 2 26). How could it be possible — particularly if there had been a long and hazardous separation — that the Philippian church should do other than send succor to their absent pastor? And, so doing, how could they possibly fail to make some kindly enclosure to Paul? The fact is, as we shall see, that many cumulative indications point to the conclusion that Epaphroditus had made the long journey *with* Paul as the Philippian representative, and that his supposed journey from Philippi direct to Rome bearing the Pauline gift is wholly a misinterpretation of the passage referred to. *Per contra*, it is only necessary to point out the difficulties of any other view. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the declared ignorance of Paul regarding the condition of the Philippian church, when he addressed the Epistle. If we accept the theory of a special journey, only a few months at most can have elapsed since Epaphroditus left Philippi, well aware of the situation through long years of spiritual intimacy and leadership; and yet Paul proposed to send

source which is used in each case and not the *διά* of *agent*. Regarding the distinction Paul is extremely careful. Romans 1 5 presents an exact parallel, where agency is intended. See also Gal. 1 1, 12.

Timothy thither that he may secure report of the state of the church (Phil. 2 19); as if Epaphroditus, "brother, fellow-worker, and fellow-soldier," was not qualified to give such a report. But if it is four years since such personal news has come, the situation becomes entirely transparent.

But this difficulty is only the beginning of the considerable series of perplexities in which the theory involves us. It is evident that some little time must have elapsed after Paul's arrival in Rome before the Philippian church could know that he was there, or, even so, would long remain there. Indeed the supposition was quite otherwise. He had appealed for a Roman release. Moreover there was nothing to indicate that he was in any such special need as to warrant so notable an embassy. Nor is there anything in Paul's remark to indicate that the Philippian gift was of such a material or consequential size as to demand so important a bearer. The reference, crowded as it is into the closing paragraphs of the Epistle, is quite to the contrary. How improbable that the Philippian pastor should be sent on this long journey with such a present! This is very different from asking a convenient traveler to bear help to their own pastor who, they know, is seriously ill in Rome and of whose illness we are particularly informed that the Philippians had heard.

Then, too, the theory involves an amazingly swift and complicated program for Epaphroditus. First, the Philippian church must become aware that Paul is in Rome and that the conditions are such as to keep him there. Then there must be the movement to send him a gift of such consequence that no one less than the pastor should be sent to bear it. Then there is the journey. Then there must have been some experience in which the messenger hazarded his life for Paul's sake (Phil. 2 30). Then, if Epaphroditus and Epaphras are identical, he must somehow have been arrested and singularly enough

become Paul's fellow prisoner (Philem. 23); then there must have followed the long, serious sickness — so prolonged indeed that the Philippian Christians can hear of it, and Epaphroditus be so troubled by the knowledge that they have heard of it (Phil. 2 26) that on his recovery he is eager to be back among them. Surely this is a tolerably eventful experience if it must be crowded into this short trip. By far the simpler view is that Epaphroditus never made such a trip, and if not, that he came to Rome with Paul as the Diarist.

Once we are relieved of this burdensome misconception, how simply and accurately every item slips into its natural place. The "we" document begins at Troas, which was in the same Roman province with Colossæ where Epaphroditus had been at work (Col. 1 7; 4 12, 13). Let us revive the situation in our minds. As Paul was starting for Antioch in the third journey his party had suddenly been disrupted by the loss of his strong companion Barnabas. He then took Silas, but in no sense could the latter make good the place of the former; he was distinctly a satellite. So Paul is on the watch to recruit his broken group. At Lystra he claims Timothy, also a distinctly younger disciple. What more natural than at Troas, facing the immediate call into the Great Adventure, he should feel the need of some experienced and successful pioneer of the gospel, and again what more natural than that he should turn to the approved founder of the near-by churches of Colossæ, Laodicea, and Hierapolis (Col. 4 13). Of this notably successful evangelist Paul must have long known, but all the evidence goes as well to show that thus far they had never labored together. So large a field must have long and exclusively occupied Epaphras, and, on the other hand, we know in particular that Paul had never visited these churches (Col. 2 1). On this very journey we are specifically told that Paul passed hurriedly to the north of this

region, "having been forbidden of the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia" (Acts 16 6), and hastened direct to Troas. There, suddenly called to venture on the European crusade, he solicits the experienced services of Epaphras, near at hand, who joins him at Troas. In a word, the Diarist has had no previous personal experience with Paul to record. The document began at Troas substantially as we now have it, and no excuses are necessary for any elimination of earlier portions.

So the Diarist comes to Philippi. Here also the events are equally obvious. The experience of Epaphras at Colossæ has fitted him for the constructive work in the first European center. He has been known more familiarly in his native region as Epaphras. Here he takes the more dignified title of Epaphroditus. Here the Diarist, whoever he is, stayed for the six eventful and formative years weaving his life into the affections of the Philippian Christians. Who can this possibly be but Epaphroditus, as his likeness is drawn for us in the Epistle of Paul to the Philippians? We are here told in detail that Epaphroditus belongs to the Philippian church; he is their outstanding representative (Phil. 2 25); their hearts are bound up in him and he is longing to be back with them; and to them Paul sends him back, with the Epistle, as evidently to his own people (Phil. 2 25, 26). While he is still remembered affectionately in Colossæ, his home and heart have been essentially transferred to the loving and generous church at Philippi. So exactly does the photograph fit and so accurately are we led by the appearance of this plural personal pronoun.

But if all this is true to life, how much more amazingly clear and detailed is the identification of Epaphroditus in the journey from Philippi to Rome. As pointed out above, the Diarist was obviously the representative selected for Philippian membership in the collection deputation. How accurately the experiences of Epaphroditus

fit into such a commission both in its public capacity and in its personal relations to Paul is fully set forth in Philip-
 pians 2 25-30. Now that we are relieved of the misconception that these verses relate to a later journey, we see at once how adequately and exactly the passage refers to the conditions and circumstances of the Diarist's journey. Instead of the unaccountable silence regarding him in all Pauline literature which has seemed so amazing, we at once find that this situation has been due only to our oversight of most ample and appreciative references to him which are really wonderfully clear.

We have seen, for example, that Paul's conception of the deputation is so lofty that he calls the members of it *apostoloi*, using this rare and sacred designation. Now strangely enough he gives this very designation to Epaphroditus (Phil. 2 25) setting him forward alone out of the Roman group, with the exception of Timothy, also a member of the same deputation, to bear this title. Conceiving that this designation of Epaphroditus referred merely to the supposed later journey of personal service, the English translators have been unable to understand Paul's use of this high term for a simple and individual kindness to himself, and have softened the word into "messenger."² Thus is Paul supposed to doze regarding his high church conception of apostleship. But Epaphroditus' title to the name is now perfectly clear; with the rest of the deputation he is to Paul, for that reason, an apostle.

² Strangely enough, the only other place where the accurate translation is thus abandoned by the Revisers is in the reference (II Cor. 8 23) to the other members of the same deputation. Not realizing that they are such, and that they have already thus been appointed not only to carry the collection but also to promote it, and failing also, as I think, to realize how large the whole project bulked in Paul's mind, they have here also softened the word into "messenger," thus throwing confusion into the whole Pauline use of the word. The identification of all these members of the group as in Paul's mind entitled to the name "apostle," helps most significantly to clarify for us the whole Pauline conception of this office, regarding which he is so deeply concerned (I Cor. 9 1, etc.).

We have seen, however, that membership in that group was not solely a public ministry. In some sense it involved a commitment to Paul's personal fortunes or misfortunes. Four of the group, at least, did not stop at Jerusalem, having fulfilled the collection service, but went on to Rome, though only two, Aristarchus and the Diarist, seem to have traveled in the same ship with Paul. This dual relationship is exactly reflected in this Philippian reference to Epaphroditus. He is there "your apostle and minister to my need." Is it possible that the actual relation of the Diarist to Paul could in any way be better described?

And now about the experiences of the journey itself, its labors, its risks, its hardships, its intimacies, and finally its perilous shipwreck and the rescue; has this all slipped from Paul's memory, and particularly has the Diarist, the only comrade with him and Aristarchus in the ship of his imprisonment — has he disappeared? Not at all. In later years, as has been pointed out, Aristarchus was remembered as a "fellow-prisoner" (Col. 4 10), and so also (Philem. 23) is Epaphroditus. And he is the only other person at Rome besides Aristarchus who is so denominated. And as for the other circumstances of the journey, what could be more adequate and exact than the passage in Philippians (2 25-30): "I . . . send to you Epaphroditus, my brother and fellow-worker and fellow-soldier, and your apostle and minister to my need . . . for indeed he was sick nigh unto death; but God had mercy . . . on me . . . that I might not have sorrow upon sorrow. . . . Receive him . . . and hold such in honor; because for the work of Christ he came nigh unto death, hazarding his life to supply that which was lacking in your service toward me." So tenderly and loyally does Paul remember his comrade of the terrible voyage.

Thus did the Diarist Epaphroditus come to Rome. From that time on the developments are equally natural

and simple. Arrived in Rome, Epaphroditus soon falls seriously ill (Phil. 2 27). Perhaps it is not rash to suggest that the record indicates that the exposures and dangers of the voyage had something to do with this. At any rate the active companionship with Paul ends. The illness is long enough continued for the Philippian church to hear of it (Phil. 2 26) and to send some ministration to his need, in which was also included a remembrance to Paul (Phil. 4 18). Convalescing, Epaphroditus turns longingly (Phil. 2 26) to the faithful friends of the Philippian church from whom he has now been separated for years and among whom his affections have taken deepest root. He is indeed Paul's companion only by virtue of the fact that he is the officer and representative of that church. If Paul desires a detailed and personal report of conditions at Philippi, another messenger must go (Phil. 2 19), for Epaphroditus departs not to return; his companionship with Paul is over at least for many a day. This disposition to return fits in with the mood of Paul to communicate with the church at Philippi. Indeed this mood seems to be more inclusive. In his confinement he broods over the condition of the churches which he has cherished. Every word regarding them is a matter of deep concern to him. Not only Philippians but Colossians and Philemon are the evidence, to say nothing of the Ephesian and Laodicean Epistles. These were evidently written not far apart, and it is at least possible that the convalescent Epaphroditus carrying the Epistle to the Philippians is accompanied nearly to his home by Tychicus (Col. 4 7, 8), bearing the Colossian Epistle. Indeed it looks as if the delegation of the churches was now finally breaking ranks. In such company and under such circumstances does Epaphroditus turn homeward and disappear from us down the Philippian way.

The final and perhaps, individually, the most striking piece which now fits into the convincing completeness of

this remarkable mosaic is the very fact which heretofore has been so inexplicable — the "we" record ends after the first few days in Rome. This is precisely where it should end — with the termination of the intimate companionship of Paul and Epaphroditus. It is not unlikely that the diary was cut short by the illness of the writer and that the record was never resumed. In any case, here is no strange decapitation of a priceless document. It began with the writer's personal experience of Paul; it was dropped when they temporarily separated; and it ended with their parting at Rome; and the manuscript in its entirety is embedded in the book of Acts exactly as its evident value would lead us to expect.

The particular thesis is here ended; but from this new assurance we inevitably look off into other and most suggestive areas. Did the invalided Epaphroditus ever reach Philippi? Did his record include originally only the strictly "we" passages, and were the interstices filled in later or by other hands? With his historical interest facilitated by his long delay at Jerusalem, was it he who accumulated the other memorials of the early church which are involved in the Acts, and did he carry them back to Philippi where they were later woven into the one fabric? Or was his document with others left at Rome in the hands of Luke, his attending physician, and was it there inwrought, a shining thread, into another's narrative of the advancing dominion of the Master? Is it possible that Luke's association with the Acts is due to the fact that the basal documents were passed on to the Redactor through him? Or is it more likely that the elimination of Luke from earlier association with Paul, and so from any personal acquaintance with the details of the ecclesiastical beginnings, makes it possible that he was comparatively young when he first appears at Rome, and therefore was perhaps himself this late, and in many respects, uninformed Redactor? Was it his deliberate

thought to confine himself in Acts to an editing of the manuscripts of others, as he did also in the Gospel, thus covering a period with which he, and possibly Theophilus, had no personal association? Was it perhaps his plan to add a third book which should give his own reminiscences of later days, thus taking up the thread himself where others had left it? These are most interesting questions. In the growing light that is falling upon these early days of the church and the identification of the Aramaic Greek sections of the earlier part of the book, it may not be impossible that these questions shall yet have their illuminating answers.

THE ROMAN CHURCH AND MODERN ITALIAN DEMOCRACY

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Among the many anecdotes about Pope Sixtus V, a stern figure of an Italian Pope-king of the sixteenth century, there is one which tells of an old Franciscan friar who had been a close friend of the Pope when the latter in his young days was a friar himself, known by the name of Felice Peretti, living in a small convent of northern Italy. When "Fra Felice" was elected Pope, his friend thought that Sixtus would not forget him and would call him to Rome and perhaps make him an important personage in the Curia. But no call came from Rome, not even an acknowledgment of the humble letters of congratulation sent with so many hopes by the old friar to his exalted friend. So he decided to go to Rome and speak personally to the Pope. After many hours of waiting in the antechamber he was admitted to the papal presence. Sixtus looked at him with indifferent eye as if he never had known him. It was more than the old friar could bear; he knelt down to kiss the Pope's feet and addressed him with a Latin verse in which there was a delicate allusion to a certain Aesopian fable about changing skin:

"Sancte Pater, scire vellem, si Papatus mutat pellem."

("Holy Father, I should like to know whether papal dignity changes one's skin"). To which the Pope, who knew his Latin well, answered immediately with another Latin verse:

"Pellis papae non mutatur, sed nullius recordatur."

("The skin of the Pope does not change, but he does not remember anybody). The anecdote may well be true.

Really its value is beyond the anecdotic realm, and Sixtus' reply, slightly modified, may be considered as the program of many a Pontificate. As a matter of fact, there is no institution which presents such an unbroken historical continuity in its development and such a consistency in the fundamental points of its definite program as the Papacy. "*Pellis Papae non mutatur.*"

From the remote day in which the Papacy acquired the consciousness of its power up to the present day, its maximum program has been and is the same — to control the complex whole of human life and social organization through the spiritual power in order to make possible the conditions which alone can lead individual souls to eternal salvation. The Papacy is logical; if the keys of the kingdom are in the hands of Peter, it is Peter who must see to it that the conditions which will make the soul worthy to enter the door should be made accessible to all men.

No less true is the second part of Sixtus' verse: "*Sed nullius recordatur.*" Has the Papacy learned anything from history? If we look at the maximum program as mentioned above, it has not; the Papacy has forgotten, or rather has not paid any attention whatever to all the failures and disappointments which have followed its boldest attempts to acquire full control of human society. But if we consider the individual programs of most of the Popes, the practical method of action adopted by them in order to reach the end of the maximum program, then we shall find that not only have the Popes learned a great deal from history, but they have learned much more than all other political and religious leaders, to such an extent that their institution is the only one which has survived after so many centuries of hard struggle, in which powerful empires and strong political and social organizations have disappeared one after another.

To follow a skillful process of adaptation to the ever-changing condition and circumstances of the times, without modifying the final purpose; to change the road without changing the goal; to change the attitude without changing radically the mind; to give to each Pontificate a personal character without breaking the unity and the continuity of all the Pontificates — such has been and is the secret of the immortality of the Roman Papacy.

A necessary issue of such a policy, of such a process, when it is adapted to an historical institution, is that its activity takes an essentially conservative character; it does not create new initiatives, but follows those started by others and struggles to bring them under its own control and to adapt them to its own general and traditional program. But an institution which considers itself as definitive, complete, and unchangeable, as the Roman Church does, is naturally led to oppose all new tendencies and even all new interpretations of old principles. Thus it happens that the Papacy, as the representative and central power of Roman Catholicism, is perpetually struggling between two impulses leading in opposite directions. On the one hand is the principle of resistance, which is the result of its consciousness of being the only true religion, unchangeable in its essence and in its form of government; on the other hand is the dynamic tendency, which is inseparable from the natural instinct of conservation of life, proper to all individuals as well as to all historical institutions. The former makes of the Papacy an irreconcilable enemy of the law of mutability, inherent in human nature and identical with the law of progress; the latter obliges it to come to terms with new conditions involving new principles and to reconcile itself, *bon gré, mal gré*, with them. The equilibrium between the two opposite tendencies is reached only through compromises; theological and philosophical compromises

in the realm of doctrine, ethical, political, and legal compromises in the realm of fact.

After all, a compromise which could bridge the eternal and the transient, the immovable and the ever-changing, has been and is the greatest problem of all metaphysics as well as of all religions. And it looks as if the old pagan title which became the exclusive qualification of the Roman bishops, "Summus Pontifex," was providentially chosen to represent exactly the main occupation of the Papacy — that of building incessantly new bridges to keep the Church in contact with the progressive life of mankind. In times of old, when human progress was slow, some of those bridges were real monumental constructions, which gave to their builders the idea that they would last forever, so deep-laid were their foundations both scientific and political; but in more recent times events follow so rapidly, science and politics have undergone such radical changes, principles and institutions are under such a direct fire from every side, that all old and new bridges are easily carried away by the swift current, and the task of the Papacy has become a very difficult one. There is no possibility for a conservative institution like the Papacy to keep pace with the great speed of today's political and social life, and the question is no more of building solid stone bridges but only of throwing at least a narrow plank across the gulf, so as not to be cut off entirely from modern thought and life.

During the last fifty years the loss of the temporal power, with its consequences, brought to the Papacy in a more striking way the realization that the modern world had gone too much ahead in its religious, political, and social ideals, and that it was time for the Church of Rome to speed up in order to gain the ground lost under the reactionary Pontificates which had identified themselves with the principles and ideals of the ancient regime. Accordingly Pope Leo XIII with a stroke of the pen

obliterated all the condemnations of his predecessors against democracy. From his Pontifical chair he declared that the principles of democracy not only are not radically opposed to or in any conflict with the Church, but, on the contrary, they find in the Church their natural ally and their religious legitimation. Fifty years before, Lamennais had been excommunicated for propounding the same principle.

It is true, however, that Pope Leo had not a very comprehensive idea of democracy and was very far from being inclined to accept all the logical consequences involved in really democratic principles. But he could not ignore the fact that under the democratic regime, conceived as the rule of the majority with a fair consideration of the rights of the minority, the social question was assuming a political character and as such was to be the final test of the organizing power of modern democracy. The Pope therefore went a step further, and in a much celebrated document (Encyclical "*Rerum novarum*." — "*De conditione opificum*") assumed that the Catholic Church, as it was the cradle and the guardian of true democracy, was also in possession of the golden rule which alone could solve in a satisfactory way all social problems.

Those outside the Church were not much impressed by Leo's words. They thought they were no more than pious vagaries of a theologian who, compelled to face a new situation, looks at it through his theological glasses and finds that there is really nothing new in the world, "*nil sub sole novi*," and all he has to do is to put the same old wine into new bottles. But even as such, Pope Leo's conservative dilettantism in sociology was a very clever stroke of ecclesiastical policy. It was another plank across the gulf between the Church and modern life.

But the greatest problem with which the Papacy has been confronted in the last half-century is that of its relations with the new Italy. The various questions aris-

ing in the Church at large did not present difficulties which could not be solved by compromises. Diplomatic bargains with the various governments, both Catholic and non-Catholic, could always be negotiated, and in its long political tradition the Roman Curia had developed a remarkable skill and almost unique ability in settling those matters to its own advantage. Moreover the task had become easier on account of the frank attitude taken by the Catholics themselves of the various countries, who had not concealed their unwillingness to support the Curia in eventual attempts to interfere with the internal politics of their nations. They either organized themselves in political national parties of their own, as in Germany, and in such a case they were led to emphasize their character of national-political associations in order to avoid the much feared accusation of political and religious ultramontaniam; or, as happened in the United States, participated in the political life of their country as mere individuals according to their personal political connections and local interests. In both cases the Vatican had to limit its activities to the religious sphere, concealing even the thought of political purposes in its influence over Catholic believers.

As a matter of fact, where a political activity was carried on in the name of the Church, the fault was not so much of the Papacy as of groups of unscrupulous Catholic politicians who wanted to use the authority of the Church and the Papacy to the advantage of their own political party, as in France; provoking the retaliation of the opposite parties and producing the final political estrangement of France from the Vatican.

But in Italy the situation was totally different. Here the Papacy had an avowed program of political claims aiming at the overthrow of Italy's new regime, either by means of foreign intervention or by internal dissolution. To effect such a purpose the Papal diplomacy had the

task of creating all possible difficulties for the Italian government in its dealings with the governments which were in diplomatic relations with the Pope. Those governments, although officially friendly to Italy, yet were more than glad to have always within reach a powerful means of intimidating the Italian government by reopening the Roman question under the pretext of complying with the wishes of their Catholic population. And they made use of it. It was thus that France imposed its policy on the new kingdom for more than a decade, and it was through this as well as in other ways that Bismarck succeeded in pushing Italy into the unnatural alliance with Austria and Germany. Even in the last war it was used as a scarecrow by the Central Powers to prevent Italy from joining the Allies.

The Pope thought perhaps that the Papal claims could more easily be realized by provoking an internal incurable crisis. With such an aim Pope Pius IX first and Pope Leo XIII afterwards, made it a crime for Italian Catholics to take part in the political management of their country.

This political sabotage ordered by the Vatican was intended to make it impossible for the Italian government to root itself in the national consciousness and to bring about its fall in a short time. That way once chosen, the Vatican insisted on it with its usual obstinacy; although it appeared immediately that the great majority of the Catholic Italian laity did not take seriously the Papal veto.

After the advent of Leo XIII, and under his inspiration a great effort was made to influence the young Italian generation and to impress on their minds that Italy's evils and weakness were the consequence of its sins against the Church, and therefore that it was a religious as well as a patriotic duty to reëstablish the political Papacy in order to create a greater Italy. This propa-

ganda, carried on with great fervor in the Catholic schools, by the Catholic papers, and by the official Catholic organization called *L' Opera dei Congressi*, was so successful that Pope Leo thought the time had come to go a step further and to proclaim his democratic sympathies to the world. It was a concession which was supposed to destroy new objections against his political program, and to make it appear as representing the newest spirit of the time, instead of being a recast of a program definitely discarded by the national consciousness of young Italy.

But such a deception could not last long. The young Italian Catholics came to realize very early and at their cost, what was the real meaning of such a program and how it was primarily directed against Italy's national existence. They could not see any valid reason why the same Church which not only allowed but made it a duty for a Catholic Frenchman or Englishman or American to be loyal to his national government, whether it were Catholic or Protestant or neither, was authorized to make it an unpardonable sin for an Italian Catholic to love and respect the democratic government of his country; a government legally elected by the majority of the population under laws of freedom, which had been conquered after so many centuries of slavery at a price of enormous sacrifices and heroic struggles. The logical conclusion of the movement was to deny the authority of the Pope to impose upon the Italian Catholics a *political* program, and to claim for themselves the same freedom in political matters which was not denied to the Catholic believers of all other countries. The reply of the Vatican to such a bold claim was the excommunication of the leaders like Romolo Murri, and the condemnation of the *Lega Democratica Cristiana* as being a heretical organization.

The reason was obvious. The new Pope, Pius X, was not a politician like Leo XIII, and although at the beginning of his Pontificate he, as usual, published a protest against the Italian government, yet he was not at all anxious to recover the temporal power. Coming not from diplomacy but from the ranks of the diocesan clergy, Pius X knew well the feelings of the Italian population, and had come to realize that the greatest menace against the Church and the Papacy was not the liberal Italian government but the Socialist party, which in Italy assumed from the very beginning a strong anti-religious character. Now two ways were open to the Pope to counteract the progress of the Socialist party in Italy: either by supporting openly the young Christian democratic party which had already formulated a program of social reforms with a Socialist flavor, or by throwing the Catholic forces into the balance in favor of the old conservative parties in order to strengthen their power of resistance to Socialism. In the former case the Pope would have met Socialism on its own ground and become the moral leader of a progressive movement.

But the adoption of such a program involved two concessions: first, a definite and clear statement which would end the conflict between Italy and the Papacy as to the temporal power, and thus enable the young Catholic-democratic party to be sincerely loyal to the State as well as to the Church; second, the grant to the same party of that autonomy and self-government which is an essential character of a really democratic policy. A democracy under the absolute control of an infallible and irresponsible power is nonsense. Pius could do neither. Although personally unconcerned about the temporal power, yet he was not bold enough to disregard the traditions of the Vatican policy and to overcome the influence of his environment; and on the other hand he was too conscious of his infallibility and of the divine character

of his authority to admit any limitation to it in his relations with Catholic believers, even in matters of political and social program.

The other alternative was chosen. The Pope granted to the Catholics permission to take part in the electoral campaign, not however, with a platform and candidates of their own, but only to help with their votes men of the various reactionary parties in order to defeat the Socialist candidates for Parliament. Obligated to make a choice between the old Liberal party, which had deprived the Pope of his temporal power but which had given to him the law of guarantees, and the Socialist party with its hostility to religion in general, Pius did not hesitate. But the great majority of the Catholics did not dissimulate their dissatisfaction; they felt deeply humiliated that after so many years of work to organize themselves and to get ready for the day, they would only be allowed to make their political *début* in a secondary rôle, as supporters of the old discredited Liberal party, creating the impression among the masses that the Catholic party was radically opposed to a program of much needed social reform. And their claims were such that the Pope at the next election did not dare to oppose entirely their wishes. They were allowed to have at least a number of candidates of their own, and, although without official approval but with the tacit consent of the Vatican, a Catholic group was formed in the Italian Parliament. It was not strong, having only about twenty members; it was not brilliant; but it represented a definite step towards the complete abolition of the old system, which had kept the Catholics from taking part officially in the political life of the country.

It did not take long for the Vatican to realize that it was not an easy task now to keep the Catholic group of the Parliament under a strict control. The Catholic deputies, challenged in the Chamber by the Radicals to

formulate their attitude towards the papal claims against Italy, did not hesitate to express their unbounded loyalty to the institutions and the unity of the nation with Rome as capital. The *Osservatore Romano*, the official organ of the Vatican, grumbled, and remarked that the deputies of the Catholic group did not represent at all officially the Catholic organizations, because the Pope never had explicitly recognized them, and therefore their feelings and their words were not to be taken as inspired or in accordance with those of the Vatican. There became apparent then the fundamental equivocation which was inherent in the Catholic political organization; that is to say, on the one hand the Vatican claimed full and exclusive control of the organization and its representatives, and on the other hand refused to assume official responsibility for the natural and practical results of its activity. As a matter of fact, the Pope could not assume such a responsibility. Being the head of the universal Church, he could not allow him self to become the responsible leader of a political party in the Italian kingdom without descending from his high rank and creating a great danger for the Church, the danger of identifying the Church itself with a local political party and exposing it to the unavoidable consequence of paying the price of an eventual defeat with the same party. But, on the other hand, to resign the control of the Italian Catholic party was too much of a revolution for the Vatican policy; it was a humiliating confession of lack of power over the Catholic masses and a radical change of attitude which could not be expected from the Pope, unless as an extreme necessity.

Such was the situation of the Italian Catholics and the Vatican in regard to Italian political life when the Great War began. We have been told again and again that the Vatican had strong German sympathies and that its policy was pro-German to the core. Perhaps that is

not true; the Vatican may have been really and sincerely neutral from the very beginning, but in regard to Italy there was no hesitation. Italy's neutrality became a vital issue, and to prevent Italy from joining the Allies the Vatican played all the trump cards that were in its hands. Its failure was due to the Italian Catholic party.

The conflict which hindered from the beginning the efficiency of the Catholic party — the moral and practical impossibility of harmonizing in thought and action the allegiance to the Church required by their religious connections and the allegiance to the State required by their political interests — came to the crucial point when it became impossible to live as usual through daily expedients and compromises and to avoid definitely taking sides. The official leaders of the Catholic organizations and their official papers did all they could in support of the papal order to work for keeping Italy out of the war, but the great majority of the Catholics joined the Nationalists, who advocated Italy's intervention on the side of the Allies. And when war was declared, the Catholic group in Parliament not only supported the government but shared its responsibility by having two members in the Italian war cabinet. It was the first time in the modern history of Italy that militant Catholics belonging to Catholic organizations, usually under the control of the Vatican, became executive members of that government which is styled by the Church as a usurper, and as such is branded by the Canon law and by Pontifical decrees as an enemy of the Church and is excommunicated. The Vatican remained silent; but the official leaders of the Catholic organizations did not conceal their disapproval of the step taken by the Catholic parliamentary group, and started that unfortunate propaganda which, supported by the famous appeal for peace issued by the Pope in August, 1917, concurred unconsciously, together with the more violent Socialist propaganda, to produce the

disaster of Caporetto. The disaster, to be sure, was not what the Pope and the Catholic official leaders expected and wanted; and the heroic reaction by the Italian people was such that both took hurriedly a step backward, and while the Pope let himself express feelings of sympathy and love for Italy such as no Pope had manifested since 1870, the Catholic leaders cast aside all hesitation and became at once more nationalist than the Nationalists themselves.

In the history of the Roman Pontificate there perhaps cannot be found a more unfortunate Pontifical document than the above-mentioned appeal of Pope Benedict XV of August 16, 1917. It was equivocal in itself, and it could be, and it was, misinterpreted and ill used by both parties. The common assumption is that the appeal to the nations for a non-victory peace was made by the Pope at the request and for the benefit of Austria, in danger of imminent overthrow. There is some truth in such an assumption. The Pope could not but be very anxious to save from total ruin the Hapsburg monarchy; which was the only one left in Europe under which the Catholic Church, although kept under control, enjoyed still the position of privilege of the old regime.

But more than to protect Austria or to hinder Italy and the Allies from crushing Germany, there was in the mind of the Pope a higher and more definite purpose in issuing that appeal, apparently directed to the various belligerent governments, but in fact directed to the Catholic masses of the whole world. The real and manifest purpose of the appeal was to warn Catholics of the imminent danger of a general *social* outbreak threatening all the nations, and to spur them to action in order to impose upon the various governments a speedy peace without victory, which would enable the conservative forces of the Allied countries, as well as of the Central Empires, to get together and form a coalition against the common

enemy — *social revolution*. From the very beginning, when Socialism from the field of abstract theories passed to a practical activity, and became a political party with a program of social reform inspired by a materialistic conception of history and life, the Church of Rome began to worry a great deal as to the prospect of a triumphant Socialistic regime. The fact that Italian Socialism — with which the Popes and the Roman Curia were more closely acquainted than with Socialism at large — was from the very beginning radically anti-religious and had started against the priests and the Church a violent campaign very effective among the working and rural classes of Italy — this fact made the Vatican so afraid of everything that was or seemed to be connected with Socialism, that in the eyes of the Pope Socialism became no less than the beast of the Apocalypse. As a matter of fact, the Pope had reason to be worried. There was and still is a humoristic Socialist paper, *L'Asino*, published in Rome, which for years did not fail to present every week to its thousands of readers vulgar, and more frequently indecent, caricatures of priests and of the Popes themselves, which were surpassed in lack of good taste only by those to be found in the famous book of Martin Luther, *Abbildung des Bapstum (Popery Pictured)*, published in Wittenberg in 1545.

Moral scandals of priests, unavoidable in a country where there are thousands of priests and not all carefully chosen and properly educated, were the daily delight of all the Socialist papers, and the corruption of the clergy was described in dark colors as being the legitimate outcome of the teaching of the Church itself. As a whole, this campaign, aiming to represent the Church as identified with corruption and hypocrisy, tyranny and exploitation, and as such with the greatest enemy of the progress and welfare of the humble classes, succeeded very well. In cities and towns where the Socialist party

converted the majority of the population, churches were deserted, priests insulted and sometimes even chased away by popular mobs. The Vatican had a good sample of what would happen in Italy to the Church if Socialism were to establish a new regime under its control. No wonder that Pope Pius X, who during all his Pontificate was an easy mark for the caricatures and attacks of the Socialists, conceived such an *odium theologicum* against them that he did not hesitate to condemn the Christian Democrats, who did not conceal their sympathies for a part of the Socialist minimum program. It was this horror of everything having a Socialist flavor that led Pius, as we noticed above, to overcome his hatred of the old Italian Liberal party, to break Leo's policy of keeping the Italian Catholics outside the political life of the country, and to adopt the new policy of obliging them to undertake an electoral campaign in support of the candidates of the Conservative parties against the Socialist leaders.

At the beginning of the great European conflict, the Vatican sounded very early the alarm against the social revolution likely to come out of the evils of the war. Almost daily the *Osservatore Romano*, the official organ of the Roman Curia, published articles and pessimistic comments on the events of the day, and the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the bimonthly review of the Roman Jesuits, took upon itself the task of Cassandra, the prophetess of desolation, admonishing kings and governments of the impending ruin. And when the Russian revolution came to fulfill those prophecies, the Vatican, far from rejoicing, felt the iron grip of the revolution near, and raised higher the warning cry: "Et nunc reges intelligite, erudimini qui judicatis terram." It was at such a psychological moment that Benedict XV wrote his appeal for peace and it was as an attempt to stop the rising tide of revolution that he published it. But the Catholics of the world

were not responsive and did nothing to impress the various governments in the direction wanted by the Pope. Only a group among the Italian clergy and Catholic laity took seriously the appeal of Benedict, and, as was said above, that propaganda concurred unintentionally in bringing about the disaster of Caporetto.

At the end of the war it seemed that the Papacy had been left more isolated than before 1914. As a matter of fact the German revolution seemed rather hostile to the Church even in Catholic Bavaria. In Hungary where the Catholic bishops were the richest landowners and a highly influential force in politics, the Socialist regime deprived them at once of their princely estates and privileges and of their political standing. The Hapsburg of Austria, the Wittelsbach of Bavaria, the house of Saxony, and other minor Catholic royal dynasties, were wiped out, leaving the king of Spain the only crowned head in the world in communion with the Pope. England also was resentful both for the Vatican's attitude in the Irish question and for the Pope's violent protest against any arrangement in Palestine which would deny a position of privilege to the Catholics. France and Belgium were supposed to have not yet forgotten that the Pope did not raise his voice openly against German violation of the treaties and German atrocities.

But really the situation was not so bad as it looked. The European nations for one reason or another, but primarily because they emerged from the war exhausted and in sore need of bringing together in a solid block all the constructive energies of the nation, were anxious to avoid any split among the conservative parties and to gain the support and the hearty coöperation of the Catholic population and the Catholic clergy. It is not to be forgotten also, that in all the belligerent countries the clergy both secular and regular, during the war did their full duty earning the respect and the admiration even of

their religious opponents and acquiring a new and stronger influence over the populations; while on the other hand the papal diplomacy throughout the whole conflict rendered, under the direction of the Pope himself, very valuable humanitarian services to all the countries, especially in matter of relief and exchange of prisoners. No wonder, therefore, that in the course of the last months we have seen all the European governments, the old ones as well as the newly organized, eager to enter in cordial relation with the Vatican, and even in France the proposal of reëstablishing the Vatican Embassy has come again on the foreground of national politics with a great probability of success. We do not know how in a long run the new international situation brought about by the war will affect the organization of the Catholic Church, but there is no doubt that for the moment it is perhaps the only Church which, because of its strong central organization, has emerged from the chaos with the same if not larger powers and influence than it possessed before. Among other things the war has put an end to the long period of religious-political concordats, which were still in vigor in many European countries, and the Pope has already acquired, or is bound to acquire very soon, the full control of the Catholic Episcopate, and through it of the Church in all the new states emerging from the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, without the hindrances of the secular power. And under the new liberal regime of those countries the Catholic Church will undoubtedly spread more rapidly than in the past.

As for its relation with Italy, the events of the last four years have altered radically too the situation of the Vatican. A restoration of the temporal power was already out of the question even before the war. Leo XIII was the last Pope who cherished the dream of such a restoration and carried it with him to his Pontifical tomb in

Saint Peter's. What his successors aimed at was only the internationalization of the Law of Guarantees, that is to say, an international agreement to guarantee to the Pope the character of a sovereign. The Allied victory and the exclusion of the Pope from the Paris Conference gave the last blow to the illusions of the papal diplomacy, and made it once more evident that Italy will never be induced to accept an international control in its relation with the Papacy. Resignation was necessary, and the new Vatican attitude towards the Roman question was well manifested by the words of Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State of Pope Benedict: "The Holy See relies upon the *free will of the Italian people* made wiser and more illuminated in so far as it concerns the independence of the Pope." It was not a renunciation of the old claims, for this the Papacy never will make officially, but it was its equivalent for a practical program of political activity, to be carried on by the Italian Catholic party.

The Pope never recognized officially the existence of a Catholic group in the Italian Parliament, much less approved of their participation in the government. But such a group was in existence and its members had been elected by the votes of the Catholic organizations, which were not only recognized by the Pope, but were supposed to be under his control, because their executive boards were appointed by the Pope himself. Never was there a stranger situation than that of a political party whose representatives the Parliamentary group elected by its votes, instead of representing the party and of being considered as carrying out its program, were on the contrary left to formulate and adopt a program of their own, some points of which were irreconcilable with the general policy of the Vatican which controlled the party.

To find a way from such an impasse was not easy; there was no solution which could be applied with satisfaction. To take a step backward and return to the polit-

ical aloofness imposed upon the Italian Catholics by Leo XIII was out of the question; the war had so strengthened the national feeling among them that not a soul would have obeyed, not even under threat of excommunication. To follow the lines of policy inaugurated by Pius X and lend the Catholic forces to the support of the old conservative and reactionary parties of Italy not only would be against the wishes of the great majority of the Catholics themselves, but would identify the Catholic program with that of a class whose control over politics is in decay and rapidly disappearing; and it never is good to be on the side of the loser. A step further was therefore necessary. Would the Pope recognize the existence of the Catholic Parliamentary group and heal the internal dissent and straighten out the situation of the whole Catholic party? It seemed the most logical solution and yet it was the less likely to be adopted, because the Pope cannot assume the responsibility of a political party. Again, to escape such a responsibility it would have been necessary to grant to the Catholic party a complete autonomy. The situation came to be again the same it had been when Pope Pius X was confronted with the young Catholic Democratic party, fifteen years before. And again the Vatican was unwilling to abdicate the political control of the Italian Catholics, especially in a period in which the menace of a social revolution, so hostile to the Church in general and to the Papacy in particular, had become so serious and threatening to the life of the whole Italian nation.

But while in 1907 Pope Pius X could safely condemn, *pollice verso*, the young *Lega Democratica Cristiana*, which claimed autonomy and self-determination in outlining a political program, Benedict XV could not do the same in 1919 with the Catholic Parliamentary group, which had already acquired such an importance in the political life of the nation as to be represented by two

members in the Cabinet. On the other hand, if, according to the words of Cardinal Gasparri quoted above, the Papacy has come truly to rely only upon the free will of the Italian people for the final solution of the Roman question, it is evident that the free will of the Italian Catholic majority hoped for would not be able to manifest itself efficiently unless a political Catholic party were allowed to be organized, with the purpose of acquiring one day or another the control of the government. Moreover, Benedict XV became fully aware that concessions were to be made to the general social tendencies of the progressive Catholics, and that the vague indefinite formulæ expounded by Leo's old Encyclical and presented as a universal panacea for all the social evils, needed a more practical interpretation, if they were to be taken seriously and be of some use in counteracting the influence of the Socialist party. Accordingly, the period in which the Vatican felt obliged to curse *in odium auctoris* everything that had even a Socialist flavor, came to an end, and a new plank was thrown over the gulf between the Roman Church and the modern world.

That was done through a new compromise. The old Catholic party, such as it was when reorganized at the beginning of Benedict's Pontificate, was kept unmolested and unchanged under the official control of the Vatican. But side by side with it a new political party was allowed to be formed by militant Catholics, under the name of *Partito Popolare Italiano*, which, having no professed Catholic character in its title, disclaimed any control by the Vatican and by the ecclesiastical authority in general over its organization and political activity.

The Pope neither approved nor disapproved officially of the new organization and its program. The silence of the official spheres means only that the Pope, with a prudent reserve due to his character of supreme head of the Church universal, does not identify himself and the

Church officially with the *Partito*, just as he is not identified with all other Catholic political organizations of the various countries of the world. But on the other hand, this silent reserve of the Vatican does not mean at all that the new *Partito* enjoys that full independence of the Curia, that real autonomy, which may be found more or less in the Catholic parties of other countries. There are many facts which make us think the opposite to be true. As a matter of fact, the general secretary and *magna pars* of the new *Partito* is a Sicilian priest, D. Sturzo, known for his devotion to the Papacy, and any one who knows how strict are the rules laid down by Pope Pius X and still in full vigor about the participation of the Italian clergy in political movements and associations, realizes immediately that the presence of D. Sturzo in the capacity of general secretary of the *Partito*, means that directions for the *Partito* come from the Vatican and that under him they will be faithfully obeyed. The fact, however, that the Pope granted by silent acquiescence at least an apparent autonomy to the *Partito* is very important and far-reaching in its consequences on Italian political life.

But there is more. The program outlined by the new party is in the main identical with the politico-social program published almost at the same time by the four American Catholic bishops of the Committee on special war activities of the National War Council under the title "Social Reconstruction." It is well known that the American program was given a hearty approval by the Pope in his letter addressed to the American Catholic hierarchy in May, 1919. Both programs, the Italian as well as the American, embody the latest concessions that the Catholic Church has made to the radical social tendencies of the times. The difference between the two programs is that the American is concerned more directly with the details of a social reconstruction, while the Ital-

ian, on account of the circumstances in which the *Partito Popolare* was born, involves also a number of local political questions and some fundamental political principles with interpretations of them, which, at least in part, are not traditional in the Catholic official teaching.

The social part of the Italian program is bold and radical enough. It advocates the syndicalist organization of the workers, which was condemned in 1914 by Pius X, and asks for class representation in the legislative bodies of the nation. The vote for women, administrative autonomy of the provinces, reform of bureaucracy, protection of small property owners, are among other measures of improvement demanded; but more emphasis is laid upon the necessity of legislation which would make general the adoption of the coöperative system in industries, as a step toward a reasonable socialization of the producing forces of the nation, and also for effective laws to provide in a satisfactory way for the needs of old age, sickness, and unemployment. The nationalistic note is strong through the whole program, and the national aspirations of the moment are indorsed without reservation, although a vote is also formulated for the abolition of national armies and for a society of nations. As a whole it is a program that every democratic-progressive party could accept without many modifications. From the point of view of the Catholic Church it represents such a bold step as nobody would have thought possible a few years ago, when almost all of its articles would have met with condemnation. It must have been very difficult for the Curia to yield in so many points to the radical tendencies of the young *Partito*, but it will be still more difficult to carry such a program into practice without affecting deeply the spirit and the organization of the Church itself in Italy.

The *Partito* had been in life only a few months when the Italian War Parliament was finally dissolved, after hav-

ing passed a new electoral law, by which the old unimominal electoral districts were abolished, and the system of pluri-nominal districts with lists of candidates on party tickets was adopted, leaving thus a place for representatives of minorities. Such a law was in favor both of the Socialists and of the Catholics, and they made the best of it. Supported energetically by the whole clergy, and having candidates chosen with a remarkably comprehensive criterium, the *Partito* reported a signaled victory on election day. More than one hundred seats were conquered, and the *Partito* is now second only to the Socialists in number of deputies belonging to a single party in Parliament. From the first day it became evident that the great battle for the control of Italian politics will be among those two parties, and that at the crucial moment the other groups must rally around them.

But from the beginning also it became evident that there are among the Catholics of the *Partito* two tendencies, or rather that there is within it a considerable and bold group of deputies who are more radical than the *Partito* can afford to be at the present moment, and who in the matter of social questions share more fully the Socialist point of view than that of the Catholic leaders, and as a matter of fact they, more than once, have cast their votes with the Socialists, breaking the party discipline. Will the *Partito* be strong and vital enough to overcome this internal crisis, and to establish such a sound party consciousness as that which gave to the German Center party almost the control of the Reichstag for many years? And if it does, will this internal accord be reached on the ground held by the more conservative tendency, or on that of the radicals? And in the latter case, will the Vatican go so far as to indorse their revolutionary program? This is the problem.

Up to the present day the Vatican officially ignores the *Partito*. No doubt, however, that *les enfants terribles*

must have been called more than once *ad reddendam rationem* of their rebellion, but it is still too early to foresee what the future has in store for the *Partito*. It is very probable that for a while the conservative tendency will prevail in it and that the more or less secret instructions of the Vatican will be followed; but it is probable also that the logic of events will in time lead the *Partito* to conquer and to affirm openly and in fact that full independence from an irresponsible power behind the scene, that real autonomy, which will be necessary to its life, and of which now it possesses only the appearance granted to it by way of compromise. What will then the Vatican do? Will it, rather than accept the fact of the real autonomy of the *Partito* and all the consequences of it, disavow the *Partito*, withdraw its favor and support, decide to retire again behind the trenches and to enjoin upon the Italian Catholics to refrain again from taking part in the political life of their country?

Such a task would be as impossible as to push back the running water of a stream to its source; but even to try would be extremely dangerous. It would alienate from the Papacy the young true Italian democracy, which has already conquered the greatest majority of Italian militant Catholics. It is from the ranks of these Catholics that the Roman Curia has received its capable leaders, its skillful diplomats, its energetic prelates, and its Popes. The consequence therefore of a definitive estrangement of the Vatican from the Italian democracy would be so far-reaching that the Italian members of the Curia are anything but cheerful in foreseeing what would happen in case such an event were ever realized. But there are, as there have always been in the past, non-Italian elements at work in the Curia, to whom the idea of the great Roman Bishop taking up his residence in Maynooth or in Boston or Baltimore would appear so full of possibilities and thrill as to compensate the Church for the loss

of Italy's new democracy. And they add oil to the fire. But Rome has not forgotten the captivity of Avignon. The lesson then taught to the Church was such that no Pope can afford to forget it and be bold enough to renew an experiment which proved almost fatal to the whole of Roman Christianity. That is why the Popes must be Italian and must come to terms with Italian democracy.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE BOOK OF JUDGES, WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES. C. F. BURNEY, D.Litt., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture in the University of Oxford. Rivingtons. 1918. Pp. cxxviii, 528, with maps and phototype plates.

Professor Burney's preface, after reminding us that Biblical science does not stand still, and that we should be daily widening the basis of our research, declares that "for himself, he can say with truth that such first-hand acquaintance with the Babylonian and Assyrian language and literature as he has been able to acquire during the past fourteen years or so, has revolutionized his outlook upon Old Testament studies." It is with no little trepidation, therefore, that one takes up this bulky volume of 650 closely-printed pages. But apprehension soon gives way to a sense of relief; for, although the book contains a vast amount of material not hitherto found in works on the Book of Judges, it contains little that, even if universally accepted, would seriously affect the prevailing processes and opinions of Biblical scholarship.

The chief results of the author's occupation with Assyriological learning are to be found in his admittedly disproportionate dissertations on questions which lie beyond or aside from the subject-matter of the Book of Judges. Thus there is a long section (64 pages) of the Introduction devoted to "External information bearing on the period of Judges," which sets forth and discusses with great detail all that is known — and supposed — concerning the history of Palestine and Syria, as well as Mesopotamia and parts of Asia Minor, before ever the Israelites appeared upon the stage. Some of this is highly speculative, one "if" being piled upon another until the whole edifice leans dangerously, and a great deal of it would be more in place in technical Assyriological journals; but conservative Old Testament science has no positive quarrel with it. So also with the excursus on "Yahwe or Yahu, originally an Amorite deity" (pp. 243 ff.). Old Testament scholars are well aware that the name Yahwe is not Hebrew, and must therefore have been derived by the Palestinian Israelites either from some foreign source or else from their own foreign ancestors. To be sure, the Amorites themselves, according to Professor Burney, spoke a language nearly identical with Hebrew, so that the question remains as to whence they in their turn acquired title to the god. But we are content to leave the matter

there. Nor are we much shocked to find another "additional note" on the "Early identification of Yahwe with the Moon-god" (pp. 249 ff.), a deity whose worship will have extended from Ur of the Chaldees in southern Babylonia to Haran in the north, and thence again to the wilderness of Sin on the borders of Egypt. For if Hebrew *Yahwe* is the same as *Yahu* or *Yatum* or *Ya* of the Babylonian inscriptions, then, *Sin* being the moon-god of Babylonia, the Babylonian names *Ya-ma-e-ra-ah*, that is "Ya indeed is the moon," and *Sin-ya-tum*, that is "Sin is Yatum," and the Hebrew name *Sinai*, that is "Sin's mountain," combine to attest the fact that Yahwe was at one time identical with the moon-god Sin; a conclusion confirmed by the circumstance that a North Arabian tribe of Yahwe-worshippers was called *Jerahmeel*, which is (being interpreted as a species of Hebraeo-Babylonian jargon) "the moon indeed is god"! Such may be the hole of the pit whence Yahwe was digged. It is only when we are told that the words of Exodus 24 9-11, "Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel; and they saw the God of Israel; and there was under his feet as it were a pavement of sapphire, and as the heaven itself for clearness. And upon the nobles of the children of Israel he put not forth his hand; and they beheld the deity, and did eat and drink" — that these words betray familiarity with Yahwe's lunar past, and suggest "the spectacle of the moon, riding at the full in the deep sapphire sky," that we are inclined to balk. One may, if one chooses, identify the bearer of the name *Yahu* in the Babylonian records with the Moon-god or anything else, in the absence of evidence to the contrary; but one must be careful not to let the Israelites of the historic period know that the talk is of their national deity. For they would hardly have allowed the prophet Elijah to travel forty days and forty nights beyond the southern confines of Canaan, to a cave on Mount Horeb, for an interview with the moon; or have dealt so savagely with a recognized fellow servant of the moon as they did with Sihon, king of the Amorites. And we may add — it is the author who raises the question — that Christians, at any rate, will probably continue to think "the alternative conception of a revelation in human form less unspiritual."

More sane and to the point is the essay on "The use of writing among the Israelites in the times of the Judges" (pp. 253 ff.), although this too is somewhat marred by a fantastic Assyriological note on the "Sumerio-Akkadian" origin of the Phoenician alphabet. The author's treatment of historical questions is naturally more successful where the field is less nebulous and the data more tangible.

For example, the section of the Introduction on the chronology of the Book of Judges furnishes an excellent conspectus of that involved subject, and, except for the erroneous assumption of the trustworthiness of the genealogy in I Samuel 14 3 (a demonstrable scribal concoction), leaves little to be desired. The first business, however, of a commentary on an ancient text is, not to discuss the historical problems which it suggests, but to determine, so far as possible, when and in what environment the writer of it wrote, just what he said, and what he meant. When this much has been achieved by the exegete, the historian may take up the task — preferably in a separate volume.

With regard to the composition and date of the Book of Judges, the author adopts in the main the conventional critical view. Our present book is a post-exilic enlargement of an earlier work, the so-called Deuteronomistic Judges; which was in turn merely a homiletical edition, with introduction and notes, of certain narrative extracts from a composite "prophetical" history book identical with the JE source of the Pentateuch and Joshua. Chapters 1 1-2 5, 9, 16, and 17-21 were not included in that edition, but were inserted, chiefly from the still extant JE source, by the post-exilic redactor R^P. Professor Burney departs from the current view, however, in denying emphatically that the earlier edition of Judges is properly characterized as Deuteronomistic, holding that, on the contrary, it antedated the Deuteronomic legislation and reform, to the development of which it very materially contributed. The principal argument for this contention is linguistic: unlike Joshua and Kings, the Book of Judges contains few of the stock phrases of Deuteronomy, showing affinity rather with the language of Joshua 24 and I Samuel 12, which are commonly assigned to the later stratum of the E document. He accordingly designates the earlier editor R^{E2}, "Redactor of the late Ephraimitic School," instead of R^D. The linguistic argument is by no means conclusive; for it is quite conceivable that, of two writers equally dominated by the Deuteronomic point of view and teaching, one should adhere more slavishly to the phraseology of Deuteronomy than the other; and the theological pragmatism of Judges, which after all is the important thing, is sufficiently akin to that of Kings. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that Professor Burney has furnished reason enough for a reconsideration of the critical position at this point, especially if, as has been plausibly maintained, the earlier Book of Judges embraced material now found in the first twelve chapters of the Book of Samuel. Unfortunately, he threatens to complicate the discussion with a theory of

his own as to the North Israelitish origin of Deuteronomy, which he promises to set forth in a future publication. When he does so, he will doubtless not overlook the fact that the theory involves the defense of the Samaritan as against the Jewish interpretation of Deuteronomy 12.

Only occasionally does the author hesitate to resolve the narratives themselves into their constituent elements, J, E, E², and R^{JE}. He detects both J and E material in the stories of Ehud, Gideon, Abimelech, and Jephthah, as well as in chapters 17-21. The prose story of Deborah and Barak is mainly E, though contaminated with matter from another source; the Song of Deborah came in with E; the story of Samson is J. In the judgment of the present writer, it is by no means certain that two primary sources underlie so many of the narratives even of the Deuteronomistic Judges; while it is absolutely certain that no second source was ever employed in the stories of the Migration of the Danites and the Benjamite War, where Professor Burney's analytical *tour de force* reminds of nothing so much as of the late Professor Green's satirical "analysis" of the parable of the Prodigal Son.¹ The important fact, which our author has failed to perceive, is that the sections inserted in the Book of Judges by the post-exilic redactor, from the still extant extra-canonical ancient literature, had an entirely different history. It is an unwarranted, though too prevalent, assumption that all the pre-exilic narratives contained in our books of Genesis to Samuel are descended in a single and direct line from the union, sometime in the seventh century, of the two documents which critics label J and E. For the rest, the characterization of the J and E national histories as "prophetical," although quite the fashion among a certain class of writers on the Old Testament, has little justification, and should be abandoned, in the interest alike of accuracy and of more fruitful research. E is a somewhat uncertain quantity; in particular, matter designated E² is not easily distinguished from that which is assigned to R^{JE} and subsequent redactions. But the J document, upon any entertainable theory of its date and compass, affords no justification whatever for the name "prophetical."

Quite the least satisfactory part of the book is the section devoted to the elucidation of the Song of Deborah, which occupies no less than 81 pages. Besides a voluminous running commentary on the text, there is a discussion of the art of Hebrew versification in general, a "detailed examination of the rhythm of the Song," a chapter on

¹ "Auch im Alten Testament kann die literarische Analyse zum Kinderspiel ausarten." Wellhausen, *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, p. 57.

its "climactic parallelism," an English translation (printed twice in full) reproducing the supposed "rhythm" of the original, and a complete transliteration of the restored Hebrew text as it was pronounced in pre-Masoretic times (!) — with this result, by way of illustration:

Awáke, | awáke, | Deboráh!
 Awáke, | awáke, | sing paéan!
 Ríse | Barák, | and lead cáptive
 Thy cáptors, | O són | of Abinó'am!
 Cóme, | ye commánders | of Israel!
 Ye that volunteéred | among the péople, || bléss ye | Yahwéh!
 Let the ríders | on táwny || she-ásses | revíew it,
 And lét | the wayfárers || recáll it | to mínd!
 Hárk | to the maídens || láughing at | the wélls!
 Thére | they recoúnt || the ríghteous ácts| , of Yahwéh,
 The ríghteous ácts | of his árm | in Israel.

This represents a "strophe" of the original (as restored by transposition, emendation, and conjectural interpretation), showing five lines of three accents each, followed by five lines of four accents, and a final line of three accents. It must not be supposed, however, that the remaining "strophes" of the song exhibit the same scheme. On the contrary, each "strophe" is a law unto itself. So that one wonders how the poor Hebrews ever divined what rhythmization was expected of them without the aid of Professor Burney's space-rules to guide them. As to the transliteration and rhythmization of the original, if the author himself has succeeded in pronouncing *hammith-naddabhím, baggabborím, umizZabhulín, tubarrakkhí, wattuyabbábh*, with but one accent as indicated, and as demanded by his "rhythm," he has performed a phonetic miracle, the wonder of which is not lessened by the specimen of *alliterative* poetry from "Piers Plowman" misguidedly adduced in the addendum on page xiv. It will be noticed from the above example, moreover, that the ancient Hebrew poets actually practiced *enjambement*! For the rest, the statement that "the theory of Hebrew rhythm expounded by Sievers is now generally adapted [adopted ?] by scholars" (p. 100) could have been made only by a writer who had failed to grasp the essence of that theory, and was but superficially acquainted with the literature of the subject. So far from being now followed "very generally" by scholars, there is reason to doubt that the theory has been entertained by Sievers himself since the year 1908, when its very foundations were demolished.

In general, the author's textual criticism and interpretation, while undeniably exhibiting abundant erudition and almost incalculable

labor, fall far short of the rigidly scientific standards set by Professor Moore's publications of twenty-odd years ago. To mention just one point, it seems incredible that a scholar living in Oxford should have contented himself with the notoriously inadequate and unreliable footnotes of Kittel's edition of the Hebrew Bible for the readings of a text so important for the Book of Judges as that of the Codex Lugdunensis.

Such spellings as Joshua', Hosea', Gide'on, Cana'an, Cana'anite, are neither English nor transliterated Hebrew.

WILLIAM R. ARNOLD.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE PRESENT CONFLICT OF IDEALS. A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WORLD WAR. RALPH BARTON PERRY. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Pp. xiii, 549.

Professor Perry has given his readers two books in one; the first an examination of the moral and religious aspects of contemporary philosophical tendencies, the second a study of the national characteristics and the political traditions of Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States. The dozen chapters which make up the latter part of the volume belong essentially to the literature of the war, and have now lost some, though by no means all, of their pertinency and interest. But the conflict with which most of the book deals has its seat chiefly in men's minds, and its fighting lines are drawn without regard to national boundaries. It is not, in spite of the title, merely a conflict of "ideals" which Professor Perry describes; it is more largely with rival conceptions of the general nature of things, of the implications of man's cognitive and moral experience, of the relation to human interests and ideals of the reality which envelops them, that he is concerned. The book, in short, has even more to do with the philosophy of religion, in the broadest sense of the term, than with ethics; though no single label could easily do justice to the range of its themes. Few of the more significant tendencies of contemporary thought are left unconsidered. Nor does Professor Perry, in the present volume, limit his interest to the philosophy of the schools. Strindberg and Maeterlinck find their place along with the more technical moralists; neither "Billy" Sunday nor George Moore is altogether ignored, among the samples of the mind of the twentieth century, and Ian Hay jostles Hegel in the

index. I know of no single book in English which at once surveys so widely and interprets, in the main, so understandingly the movement of ideas in our time, or comes so near to being a comprehensive record and analysis of the thoughts which our generation has had concerning the world we live in and the meaning of life. Professor Perry has the gift of condensing without distorting, and of being brief without being obscure; and he has therefore been able to crowd into some four hundred pages a remarkable wealth both of lucid exposition and of significant criticism.

When a book ranges over so many and so diverse issues, the reviewer must necessarily select, for serious critical discussion, only one or two of its theses. The readers of this Review will perhaps look with most interest for Professor Perry's account of the religious and practical implications of the "neo-realistic" teaching of the group of American philosophers to which he belongs. One finds with some surprise that but a single chapter is devoted to this subject, though "realism" is one of the four generic types of contemporary philosophy under which the author attempts, rather unsuccessfully, to subsume the entire mass of contemporary opinions which he sets forth — the other three being "naturalism," "idealism" and "pragmatism."

It is essential to distinguish first between those elements of Professor Perry's practical philosophy which result from his neo-realistic principles, and those which he happens to hold on quite other grounds. This distinction he himself tends to forget. "Realism," he tells us, "is theistic in its religion." But in point of fact, from neo-realism as a premise the truth of theism is very certainly not deducible. All that Professor Perry can legitimately mean is that he sees in realism no repugnancy to some kind of theistic faith, and that, for his part, he accepts such a faith. *Why* he does so, what "arguments for the existence of God" he finds convincing, he nowhere intimates. But he does not leave us in much doubt as to the kind of God he believes in. It is the temporal, finite, and struggling God of J. S. Mill and William James, of Mr. Wells and a growing company of our contemporaries. This temporalistic theology has obvious affinities with realism, inasmuch as it is irreconcilable with a genuinely idealistic epistemology. Consistent idealism is bound to conceive "true reality" as eternally complete, comprehending all time and all experience in its absolute unity. But a temporalistic theology is not necessarily irreconcilable with a spiritualistic metaphysics; and in any case, its affinity is not specifically with the "new" realism but with realism in general.

When then we look for the moral and religious implications which are distinctive of this newer philosophy, we find apparently only two. In the first place, we are told, the neo-realist "accepts the mathematical and logical part of the Platonic realism;" that is, he holds that the properties and relations of universals, "the necessities of logical implication," are existent facts independent of mind, just as he holds that physical objects, their relations and interactions, are independent existents. And this "strain of Platonic realism" has certain implications "of emotional and practical significance." For example, it excludes pure materialism; for the universals are of course neither corporeal nor psychical, but "neutral" with respect to the psycho-physical distinction. And in the contemplation of this realm of supersensible realities and timeless truths some neo-realists find a species of religious satisfaction and of consolation for the futilities of the temporal order. Some neo-realists; but hardly Professor Perry himself. For he is not one of those who see in these cold and barren ecstasies of the logician the end and consummation of human life; nor is it sufficient for him to know merely that, though all man's hopes were frustrate and all man's efforts vain, nevertheless "truth is so." His interest is manifestly in the business of the temporal universe; it is a "religion of action" that appeals to him. And such a religion is possible only if we have some assurance that we live in a world in which man's deliberations and discoveries, his purposes and deeds, are relevant and efficacious, and his ideals have at least a fighting chance of fulfillment.

It is, Professor Perry thinks, a distinguishing merit of neo-realism that it is "the only philosophy to provide such a world." It alone can without inconsistency "admit consciousness into the natural world as a genuine dynamic agent." Absolute idealism fails to do this because of its conception of "reality" as eternally complete and perfect, and as requiring as predeterminate ingredients in its perfection both all the finite evil and all the finite good that actual experience contains. But for a very different reason Professor Perry finds that the older or dualistic kind of realism is equally incapable of giving significance to human action. For it regards consciousness "as a peculiar substance, absolutely distinct from corporeal substance," and therefore as "incapable of entering into any commerce with it." Neo-realism, however, maintains the doctrine of the "immanence of consciousness"; it declares that mind is "homogeneous with its environment" and therefore "interactive with it."

This contrast between the "new" or monistic and the dualistic realism seems to me to limp upon both its legs. It is not the case,

on the one hand, that all or most dualistic realists infer from the distinction between minds or ideas and their external objects that the former are "incapable of entering into any commerce" with the latter. Doubtless Professor Perry thinks that dualists *ought* to draw such an inference; but as he offers no argument to show why they ought, he must be said to deal in a rather dogmatic and cavalier fashion with an important and difficult issue. On the other hand, it is not the case that monistic realism admits anything which can significantly and distinctively be called "mind" or "consciousness" into the natural world as a dynamic agent.

For when the neo-realist tells us that consciousness is "homogeneous" with the physical environment, he is, with some delicacy of language, denying that anything resembling what both philosophers and laymen have hitherto meant by "consciousness" exists at all. Consciousness, as commonly conceived, has certain definite attributes and powers. It can, as men have supposed, look before and after, representing both past and future in present ideas without thereby making either past or future actual. It can dream dreams, evoking images of things which do not exist, and of some which never can exist, in the physical world. It can apprehend meanings and "references" and can, in its deliberations, feel the constraining force of purely logical necessities. And it can take the form of moral self-consciousness, and, even in the act of making the interests of other selves its own, find the significance and the glow of this experience in the knowledge that those selves are not "immanent" in itself but are truly other — are distinct and independent bearers of values and possessors of interests. But a so-called "consciousness" which is strictly "homogeneous" with the external environment — which "differs from bodies very much [*sic*; the author should in consistency have said "simply"] as one bodily system differs from another" — can possess none of these powers or attributes; for the external environment, as science represents it, knows naught of them, and "bodily systems" are "bodily" only in so far as they lack them. No doubt the neo-realist would reply that his "strain of Platonic realism" saves him here; that at least meanings, logical relations, values, are for him a part of the total objective (but not exclusively material) order which constitutes the environment of the human organism, and can therefore properly be included by him among the contents of a consciousness homogeneous with that environment. Yet the reply does not meet the difficulty. For it is only as universals that these "neutral entities" find a place in the neo-realist's universe. But a pure universal, unindividuated, existing neither in

time nor space, obviously cannot be a "dynamic agent in the natural world." In short, the realm of Platonic ideas contains elements resembling certain of the distinctive elements of consciousness, but it cannot act; matter can in some sense act, but it contains nothing resembling the distinctive elements of consciousness. But as the whole of reality is, for the neo-realist, made up exclusively of these two parts — of Platonic universals *plus* material particles diversely arranged in space and time — his scheme of things nowhere affords room for any reality which *both* possesses the actual properties of consciousness and also is capable of being "a genuine dynamic agent."

In its metaphysics, in short, neo-realism is — but for its otiose appendage of Platonic realism — a soft-spoken, if not a "tender-minded," materialism. This appears most plainly of all perhaps in Professor Perry's intimation that when the new realism speaks of "mind" it uses the word in a purely "behavioristic" sense. Now behaviorism as a method of experimental inquiry in psychology has its place and finds practical justification in its results. But behaviorism as a metaphysics is simply naturalism gone mad. It conceives the whole process of consciousness in terms of physical stimulus and bodily response. It recognizes in the experience of an individual no elements which are not, at least potentially, wholly open to the direct sensible observation of other individuals — no elements, in other words, which are anything more than visible or tangible movements of the muscles or other parts of the animal mechanism. In all this, it incidentally stultifies itself; for the behaviorist philosopher puts forward his doctrine as meaningful and true, and as reached through logical processes — and yet "truth" and "meaning" can have no place among the strictly behavioristic categories, and the theory cannot recognize any such thing as the determination of the action of an animal (even though the animal be a philosopher) by logical reflection as such. If we apply the behaviorist's principles to himself, we must treat his arguments and conclusions merely as so much "animal behavior," that is, as movements of the muscles of (*e.g.*) his throat or forearm, and as nothing more.

Yet of course Professor Perry does not follow his premises out to the absurdities in which they logically result; nor — as has been seen — does he himself discover in his neo-realism the practical implications which are proper to it. On the contrary, through a considerable part of the book he carries on a vigorous polemic against naturalism; and his own practical philosophy is eminently sane, humanistic, insistent upon the efficacy of ideas and of ideals, upon the potency of man's reason both in the direction of his bodily be-

havior and the modification of his physical environment. This happy inconsistency (as it appears to me to be) seems to have come about, in Professor Perry's case as in others, in a simple and natural way. His reflection upon the problem of perceptual knowledge early persuaded him that the possibility of such knowledge is inconceivable unless the object perceived and the percept "in consciousness" are literally identical. This "epistemological monism" (being construed realistically rather than idealistically) was then converted, logically enough, into a psychophysical monism, into the doctrine that consciousness, or the content and processes which make it up, are "homogeneous" with the physical environment. But having thus metaphysically identified "mind" with "bodily systems," the new realist then quietly reads into the "bodily systems" the contents, relations, and activities which he knows, and everybody knows, actually to belong to our experience, however foreign to the physicist's conception of the properties and motion of matter. The psychical lamb, in short, is supposed to be swallowed by the materialistic lion; but when, after blood-curdling growls and the crunching of tender bones, the deglutition is finished, what appears before one is not a lion but a lamb. Yet the legerdemain by which this reassuring substitution is accomplished will hardly escape the observant spectator; nor can I believe that Professor Perry himself will remain permanently unaware of it.

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THE SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE MODERN WORLD. EDWARD CALDWELL MOORE. (University of Chicago Publications in Religious Education. Handbooks of Ethics and Religion.) University of Chicago Press. 1919. Pp. xi, 352. \$2.00.

In the large and rapidly filling section devoted to "Missions" in all the larger institutional libraries there may be found at least a couple of shelves of books dealing with the special subject, "History of Missions." Here are books attempting to cover the entire history as well as monographs treating various periods and fields, like Lemuel C. Barnes' *Two Thousand Years of Missions before Carey*, G. F. Maclear's *History of Christian Missions during the Middle Ages*, and Julius Richter's *History of Protestant Missions in the Near East*. A brief historical review of the special point of view of these historical books will disclose pertinently the nature of the change which has taken place in the concept of Christianity and of Christian Missions.

In the first two-score years of the modern period Missions were still largely a brave adventure into an almost unknown situation. Accordingly the most interesting, and perhaps the most profitable, review of their work which could be given at that stage used to be gathered in reports of heroic journeys to distant lands, thrilling personal experiences of pioneers, and many curious bits of information about strange peoples. Such was the kind of history which is to be found in Smith and Choulis' *Origin and History of Missions*. After five-score years the missionary enterprise was still regarded, and perhaps not unnaturally, as quite a distinct process from ordinary worldly affairs. Baptized converts needed to be gathered out from heathendom, and organized into church communities independently of the rest of the world; the value of the Christian Gospel which the missionaries were sent out to dispense was believed to be for an other-worldly application. Accordingly, the appropriate method of surveying such a series of events was by historical annals of an enterprise largely distinct from current events. Such was the kind of history sketched by works like D. L. Leonard's *A Hundred Years of Missions*; though the centennial epoch was bringing an appreciation of some of the sociological significance of Christian Missions, as in James S. Dennis' *Foreign Missions after a Century*.

The long story has been rehearsed from many points of interest. It has been set forth as an array of facts in chronological succession or in geographical areas. There are several chronicles, like George Smith's *Short History of Christian Missions*, F. M. Bliss' *Concise History of Missions*, and A. D. Mason's *Outlines of Missionary History*. There are also larger compendia more crowded with details, like C. H. Robinson's *History of Christian Missions*. But while there exist length and breadth in the spread of Christianity in the world, there exist also heights and depths and lights and shadows. To make use of another simile, there are also intricate interweavings with the great web of human events, connections made and long stretches dropped, which result in a curious design for Christianity in the output of the loom of history. In the hands of the erudite German Professor Gustave Warneck an *Outline of Protestant Missions from the Reformation* is simply a special study in modern Church History. In the hands of the evangelist and thrilling religious editor, A. T. Pierson, *The New Acts of the Apostles or the Marvel of Modern Missions* and *The Miracles of Missions or Modern Marvels in the History of the Missionary Enterprise* (four volumes) are simply a collection of wonder-tales, repeating apostolic events, and reporting how a supernatural gospel was brought and vindicated to a wicked world,

without much interest in historical relations or even in historical accuracy.

A vital relation between modern Christian Missions and contemporary events was first brought forth with abundance of carefully documented facts by a broad-minded successful missionary administrator, Dr. Robert E. Speer, Secretary of one of the largest American Boards of Foreign Missions. In his substantial two-volume *Missions and Modern History* the connection of the Christian ideal and the actual Christian endeavor is shown in the case of thirteen important movements selected from the history of the nineteenth century. Since then the method of a large historical orientation of the specialized effort to spread Christianity has been variously attempted, e.g., by an admirable English book surveying *The Expansion of Christendom*, by Mrs. Carus-Wilson.

However, it has remained until the agonies of the Great War for a Harvard professor, who is the President of the oldest Foreign Mission Board in the United States, to envisage the task and the accomplishments of Christianity more intimately and more comprehensively by setting the history of *The Spread of Christianity in the Modern World* into the vast and intricate framework of modern history as a whole. Here the sense of the marvelous, the sacred, and the wicked too has not been lost in the swift traversing of great events of the whole world. Not quite so frequently as in the narratives of avowedly miraculous events, yet not infrequently, there do occur, here in balanced and sober survey of history, phrases like "it is only to be wondered at" (p. 183), "it seems strange" (p. 189), and "truly amazing" (p. 207). But what evokes attention is not so much individual incidents as the marked contrasts, the mighty achievements, and also the incompleteness of the process. Laments indeed are expressed, but not so much over the deficiencies of non-Christian religious systems and the prospects of the unsaved heathen as over the abuses which have been perpetrated by professing Christians and the new evils which have been introduced from the West into the new situations in Africa and the East (see pp. 82, 270, 304, 311). Not pessimistically but discriminatingly and with hope, it is shown how the processes of advancing civilization have included both pathetic failures and gratifying successes. The proselytizing task which formerly had been deemed fairly simple, being merely "religious," is now seen to be immensely complicated with factors racial, social, governmental, economic, and with all the diversities in human nature and its environment.

Professor Moore's book is a product both of researches in the study and of experience in administrative headquarters. It is a notable

example and vindication of the best modern interpretation of Christianity and its world-wide enterprise. In contrast with the separatist point of view which, not absolutely yet too largely, prevailed in the former historians of Christianity and of Christian Missions, this latest historian presents a Christian gospel which is more immediately, more extensively, and more intensively redemptive. The situation which needs to be saved is now seen to be not less perilous; the genuine results, more glorious; the need of divine empowerment, more urgent.

"A world-view is never a substitute for religion. Amelioration is not redemption" (p. 88).

"Religion is the only remedy that we have against an inherent tendency of high civilization to destroy character and personality. What is needed is still that kind of ministry which none among men has ever so exemplified as did Jesus, and which true followers of Christ seek to exemplify. It is the alchemy which can make a son of God and a saint out of the most forlorn being in an untransformed world, but which will also infallibly set that saint upon the transformation of his world" (p. 90).

The book gives a liberal course in modern history as well as a record of Christian Missions and an insight into the meaning of Christianity. The historian's stern task of setting forth a wide sweep of events is accomplished with an abundance of narrated facts, fascinating pictures of personalities, incisive judgments, and brilliant generalizations. Perhaps the nearest comparison for scholarliness, though not of course for material, would be with a treatment which has been given to the earliest period in the history of Christianity by Harnack in his *Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*. The addition of a map or maps to accompany the course of the history, especially of the various geographical areas of the world, would leave almost nothing to be desired in a volume which, both in form and in spirit, takes a worthy place in a notable series of textbooks in religion.

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PROGRESSIVE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN AMERICA. JOHN W. BUCKHAM.
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 352. \$2.00.

To reveal to many the thoughts of their hearts is a service deserving gratitude; especially when the thoughts are not individual only, and when a development is exhibited with those of others. The solitary thinker gains courage and fuller understanding of himself when he becomes aware that he is part of a "movement," and the

world knows better where it stands when the thoughts of different minds are shown tending in a common direction.

Professor Buckham has performed this service for readers who are interested in rationality in religious thinking. His aim has been to do for the last seventy years or so in America what Principal Tulloch did for Great Britain in the nineteenth century. He has chosen six men who possessed "the great gift of Christian reasonableness," has shown the contribution of each to the broadening path of Christian thought, and has mentioned more briefly others who set up guide-posts along the way. The six studied in detail are Theodore T. Munger, George A. Gordon, William J. Tucker, Egbert C. Smyth, Washington Gladden, and Newman Smyth; while among the others are Horace Bushnell, William E. Channing, Henry Ward Beecher, Lyman Abbott, and James M. Whiton.

The studies show careful insight, and combine critical analysis of work with personal appreciation. "If in some cases," says Professor Buckham, "they suggest eulogies or even panegyrics, it is because personal contact has begotten in the author a deep but, he trusts, not unintelligent admiration for men whose breadth and earnestness of thought issued from a like nobility of mind and character" (p. vii). We do not need the author's apology to note that they do perhaps too often resemble eulogies. A glowing halo placed on every head leads the beholder to question the judgment which places it, and therefore to discount the distinction conveyed. Purple adjectives should, in their own interest, be used sparingly. Yet a better portrait is generally painted by an artist who is enthusiastic over his sitter than by one whose grudging hand raises a doubt as to his friendliness and therefore his judiciousness.

If a word were chosen to express the characteristic tone of all the men Professor Buckham describes, a tone which constitutes their thought a New Theology, it would perhaps be reality. It is a sequence to the gospel which Carlyle in his early days thundered forth. Every doctrine or opinion must accord with the facts of life and interpret them. It must be recognized as such by me before I may say I believe it. The difference between every New Theology — for there have been countless such — and its predecessor is that the older rests still in some respects on grounds external to the believer, while the newer is based on personal affirmation. The enfranchised soul says to its former conventional self, "Now we believe, not because of thy saying, for we have heard ourselves and know."

This note of reality the author finds in Bushnell's insistence on the Christian life as normal rather than alien, on intuition as a necessary

element in the reception of truth, on his breaking down the barrier between the natural and the supernatural, and on his erection of a vital Christ as the light and centre of Christian theology.

Munger found the distinctive mark of the New Theology not so much in a new set of doctrines as in a new attitude of spirit. He took theology away from the narrow realm it had established for itself and insisted that it must be at home in literature and science and the whole sphere of human knowledge.

In Dr. Gordon the analyst finds that comprehensiveness which led the older theologians into system-making, but here extended beyond any system. He completes what Bushnell began. He has been, in Professor Buckham's opinion, original in depth of apprehension of the old, and in his restoration to theology of imagination, feeling, beauty, so that his sermons are filled with theology and yet are "great lyrics."

President Tucker is characterized by public-mindedness. He has felt the spiritual meaning and value of the unity of humanity, has felt that this must express itself through authority and sympathy in the social work of the church. He may almost be called the father of the social activities in which all churches are today more or less engaged.

The most important work of Egbert C. Smyth was as an interpreter of the past, especially as an exponent of the true function and interpretation of creeds. The face value of a creed is by no means necessarily its true meaning; it cannot be understood apart from the conditions out of which it grew. It is to be regarded as a kind of algebraic formula or "summary of the principles which are to be applied and developed from generation to generation."

While Dr. Tucker put the social impetus into practical action, Washington Gladden took the new sense of social solidarity and by it as a factor multiplied theology. He worked over doctrines such as the Divine sovereignty, static revelation, a substitutionary atonement, till he brought out of them nourishing food such as fatherhood, an ever-present spirit, vicariousness, the inspiring revelation of God in Christ. Through his efforts "out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness." With his vivid social consciousness he became an ardent advocate of concord among the churches and peace among the nations.

Newman Smyth is the prophet of the evolutionary method applied to theology. Science investigates the processes through which life has come to be what it is, and Dr. Smyth declares that this is what theology too does in its so-called dogmas. They are statements, by

no means final, of the facts of life. He insists that the scientific spirit is a form of religion.

The study of the work of these men is appreciative and just. An omission in the book is a lack of treatment of the Unitarian movement, the effect of which was so deep not only in the first third of the last century, but which profoundly affected the thought of the period of which Professor Buckham writes. Perhaps this omission was necessary in brevity of treatment. It would be almost impossible to trace how much this or that man owed to the impetus Unitarianism gave. Yet some mention of that impetus would have been in place, even if no space were given to so important an element in it as Theodore Parker, with his insistence on the imperative dominance of conscience.

The last chapter of the book contains a valuable criticism of the New Theology in its relation to the future of theologic thought in America. Professor Buckham finds the central interest of the New Theology in the study of personality, and this, he holds, is the key to the theology of the future. He has given a sympathetic, judicious, and important interpretation to the school of thought of which he writes.

Every one who knows the labor of preparing an index will be grateful for the book's three ample indexes — one of names referred to, one of subjects, and one of volumes by the authors mentioned.

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SPIRITUALISM AND ITS HISTORY, PHENOMENA, AND DOCTRINE. J. ARTHUR HILL. George H. Doran Co. 1919. Pp. 316. \$2.00.

WHAT IS THIS SPIRITUALISM? HORACE LEAF. George H. Doran Co. 1919. Pp. 185. \$1.50.

The anxieties and bereavements of the war have produced in England wide, deep, and intense interest not only in psychic research, but also in the more positive and less academic Spiritualism, towards which the former seems to be swiftly and surely moving. Of the large output of books on the subject, the two mentioned above are fairly representative both in their resemblances and their differences. Mr. Hill's is more of the old-time psychic-research type, rather cautious and reserved, while Mr. Leaf's belongs squarely to the propaganda of Spiritualism. The former author is more ready than the latter to admit fraud, pronounces the evidence of materialization and Home's levitation inconclusive, acknowledges more fully the influence

of telepathy and the subliminal, and, in general, inspires greater confidence in his candor and mental poise. Yet the resemblances are striking. Both writers, for example, regard the "discerning of spirits," mentioned among the gifts of the early church, as a clairvoyant power to see invisible beings — Myers ought to set his living friends right on the meaning of New Testament Greek. Disregarding such minor matters, we find both agreeing as to the existence of a psychic force subsisting in a highly attenuated form of matter ("psychoplasm" is Mr. Leaf's name for it) which is projected from the body of the medium and perhaps also from the bodies of sitters, to which the physical phenomena are attributed. Mr. Leaf is alone, however, in finding in this theory an explanation of what is usually deemed convincing evidence of mediumistic fraud. If some part of the supposed spirit was surreptitiously marked with some colored material and after the séance the mark was found on the body of the medium, the latter was naturally discredited; but, says Mr. Leaf, "The solution to the mystery was found when it was discovered that the substance composing the materialized form was extracted from corresponding parts of the medium's body. On the form dematerializing, these elements returned to the psychic's body, carrying with them the incriminating marks" (p. 135). Both agree also that there are facts exhibited by psychics for which ordinary methods of acquiring knowledge or exercising force cannot account, and that while the subliminal consciousness and telepathy may in part explain them (although each hypothesis must be stretched almost to the breaking point) the theory of spirit communication and operation offers a simpler as well as more satisfactory solution of the problem. Now that is the precise point at which many halt. They acknowledge that there are facts, well-established but mysterious, for which explanation is demanded. Some of them can be explained plausibly without reference to spirits — dowsing, for instance, raps and table-tipping, unless these spell out an intelligible message. For others, such as automatic writing and oral communications, the hypothesis of dissociated personality or subliminal consciousness is plausible, especially in connection with telepathy, which, however, has not itself been adequately proved. There seems to be, nevertheless, a residue of facts for which the hypothesis of spirits does appear to offer a more satisfactory interpretation, and it depends very largely (as Mr. Hill points out in his pages on Belief) upon one's general mental attitude whether he will regard all the mysterious facts from the side of the residue, or the residue in the light of principles found applicable to part of the class. The convinced believer

in Spiritualism insists that only such as have had actual personal experience with these phenomena and are familiar with *nuances* which cannot be reported are competent to an opinion, and the claim must be an awkward one for theologians who maintain that their science rests upon immediate experience. But there are others who cannot bring themselves to psychologize upon a mother's grave, who know full well that if in a séance a mother's spirit should appear to be communicating, cool judgment would be completely overborne by loving emotion, and such persons must be convinced by published reports. Most of these persons probably feel that, in all the circumstances, a verdict of not proven is the only one they can honestly render; the evidence is not strong enough for full acceptance, but it is too strong for flat denial. Yet they may believe in immortality nevertheless, for there may well be survival without communication, although of course proved communication would demonstrate survival.

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THE WORK OF PREACHING. ARTHUR S. HOYT. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. 382. \$1.50.

VITAL ELEMENTS OF PREACHING. ARTHUR S. HOYT. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. 326. \$1.50.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PREACHING. CHARLES S. GARDNER. The Macmillan Co. 1918. Pp. 389. \$2.00.

THE WAR AND PREACHING. JOHN KELMAN. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 213.

Of the making of books on preaching there is no end, perhaps because there is no standard treatise on Homiletics which dominates the field. Furthermore, since the voice from the pulpit must speak to each generation in the manner to which it will listen gladly, it is essential that the preacher's emphasis and form should change and grow from decade to decade.

Among recent books on Homiletics those of Professor Hoyt are well known and useful. His treatise, *The Work of Preaching*, first appeared in 1905, but in its present form a good deal of new material has been added. The volume is well arranged and suggestive, and has been written out of a large experience and wide study of the subject. His advice to the young preacher is eminently practical, and he supplements his own words by convenient references to a few of the older books upon the subject.

In *Vital Elements of Preaching* he has written for those who have already begun to preach. The book is one which many a minister could read and ponder with profit, particularly those chapters which deal with "The Preacher of this Age," and with preaching for special groups or occasions. The two books cover somewhat the same ground and have more or less common material, especially in the way of illustrations.

In *Psychology and Preaching* Professor Gardner of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary at Louisville has undertaken to do for preachers what volumes on educational psychology have done for teachers. He begins by discussing the general mental processes, goes on to a review of the phenomena of feeling, belief, attention, and suggestion, and concludes with a discussion of the psychology of groups as seen in assemblies, occupational types, and in "the modern mind." The best chapters in the book are those on "Assemblies" and "Mental Epidemics," which have many useful suggestions of advice and warning for the preacher. Indeed the whole theme of the book is one which has received relatively little attention from preachers or from teachers of Homiletics, who may well be grateful to Professor Gardner for his discussion of the subject. What he has done, however, is but to give a psychological analysis of the factors which the great preachers of all ages have instinctively felt and acted upon. Consequently there is little in his book that is new for the reader who has had any training in psychology or for the preacher who has studied his art with care and discrimination. It must furthermore be said that the first half of the book is rather dry and technical and that a volume half the size would have held the meat of what Professor Gardner has to say.

And could not the whole subject be most satisfactorily dealt with in a book on Homiletics which should state — as few books on Homiletics have done — the psychological bases for the methods taught?

The War and Preaching is the forty-fifth series of the Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching at Yale — that remarkable foundation which has given to the world so many admirable contributions to the study of Homiletics. Dr. Kelman, at the time minister of St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh, but now of New York, has wisely refrained from attempting any formal treatise on a subject already so fully dealt with. Instead he has undertaken to interpret the work of the preacher in the lurid light of the war, of which he himself saw much at close quarters. The result is a modest volume, rather discursive, but full of charm and suggestion, due to the clarity of the

author's style, his wide outlook upon the world, and the moving experiences through which he has passed. Every minister would profit by his lectures entitled "Then Came the War," and "The Soldiers' Creed;" but indeed the whole book abounds in passages weighted with suggestions for the alert preacher, who seldom finds a vein so heavily loaded with ore.

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